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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1993, a woman by the initials H.M. became pregnant with her first
child through artificial insemination.' H.M. and her partner, E.T., had
* Ann Kathryn Watson is a candidate for Juris Doctor at St. Mary's University
School of Law, Class of 2013. The author would like to thank her family, friends, and The
Scholar: St. Mary's Law Review on Race and Social Justice Editorial Board for supporting
and assisting her throughout the writing and editing process.
1. See In re H.M. v. E.T., 930 N.E.2d 206, 207 (N.Y. 2010) (involving a birth mother's
suit for retroactive child support from her former same-sex partner). The procedure-the
culmination of several unsuccessful attempts at artificial insemination-was performed and
partially funded by her partner. Id.
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discussed having children early on in their relationship, which began in
1989.2 E.T. had a child from a previous relationship, but the couple
wanted to have a child together. H.M. gave birth to a son in September
of 1994, with E.T. at her bedside.' Four months after the birth of the
baby, the relationship ended, and H.M. and her son moved to her par-
ent's home in Canada.' E.T. continued to provide financial support for
the child, and the couple even attempted to reconcile in 1997.6 In 2006,
H.M. sought to establish E.T. as a parent and obtain a child support order
for their son, which would include retroactive child support7 from the
time the child was born.' A Family Court Support Magistrate granted a
petition to dismiss on lack of subject-matter jurisdiction filed by E.T.9
H.M. filed an appeal and the Family Court reversed the dismissal." The
Family Court also ordered a hearing to determine if E.T. could be pre-
vented from denying parentage." The Appellate Division reinstated the
Magistrate's dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, and H.M.
appealed to the Court of Appeals.' The Court of Appeals of New York
reversed the decision of the Appellate Division, stating that the court had
subject-matter jurisdiction over this case.3
The case of H.M. and E.T. represents a growing legal issue that federal
and state legislatures have failed to address. Today, many same-sex
couples have children together through artificial inseminationl4 or surro-
2. Id.
3. Id. In preparing to have a child together they discussed possible methods of con-
ception, how to properly raise a child, and the relationship the child should have with E.T's
children. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. "E.T. continued to provide H.M. with gifts for the child and monetary contribu-
tions for the child's care at unspecified times after the parties' separation." Id.
7. Retroactive child support is also sometimes referred to as "back-pay." See gener-
ally TXAccSs.oiRc, http://www.lanwt.org/txaccess/BACKCHILDSUPPORT.ASP (last
visited July 25, 2012).
8. Id.
9. Id. at 208. The court stated that there was no legal basis for jurisdiction over a
former partner with no biological relationship with the child. Id. at 207.
10. Id.
11. Id. The court ordered "a hearing to determine whether E.T. should be equitably
estopped from denying parentage and support obligations." Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 208-09.
14. See Gay Marriage and Procreation, AiRGUING EQUALITY, http://www.arguing
equality.org/chapter5.htm#1 (last visited July 30, 2012) (stating that "[s]ome gays and lesbi-
ans . . . go the route of artificial insemination or surrogate parenting." Indeed, what many
refer to as the 'gayby boom' is no small phenomenon-figures place the number of lesbian
mothers in the United States at 1 to 5 million and the number of gay fathers at I to 3
million).
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gacy.'s In both scenarios, the child is biologically related to only one of
the parents. 6 Oftentimes the non-biological parent adopts the child in
order to have legal rights, which is a process that can be costly." A prob-
lem arises when a same-sex union ends and the non-biological parent
never adopted the child. Not only does the non-biological parent have no
legal rights to make decisions regarding the child, but also in many states
the partner does not even have legal standing to seek visitation rights.'
On the other side of the problem, the biological parent is left to raise the
child alone because she lacks standing in some states to obtain child sup-
port from the non-biological parent." In addition to the lack of basic
15. See Donor Insemination: The Basics, Hum. R-rs. CAMPAIGN, http://www.hrc.org/
resources/entry/donor-insemination-the-basics (last visited July 8, 2012) (explaining the
two different processes of artificial insemination); see also Overview of the Surrogacy Pro-
cess, HUMAN Riorrs CAMPAIGN, http://www.hrc.org/resources/entry/overview-of-the-sur-
rogacy-process (last visited July 8, 2012) (describing the two types of surrogacy: traditional
and gestational).
16. See Donor Insemination: The Basics, supra note 15 (describing the intracervical
insemination as a process in which "the sperm is placed just inside the woman's cervical
opening through the use of a speculum and syringe[,]" and intrauterine insemination as
"the sperm [being] placed just inside a woman's uterus, using a flexible catheter."); Lindsey
E. Harris, Artificial Insemination and Surrogate Motherhood-A Nursery Full of Un-
resolved Questions, 17 WILLAME'r-ra L. REv. 913, 914 (1980) (defining the process of artifi-
cial insemination); Overview of Surrogacy Process, Hum. Rrs. CAMPAIGN, http://www.hrc.
org/resourceslentry/overview-of-the-surrogacy-process (last visited July 8, 2012). Stating:
[i]n traditional surrogacy, a surrogate mother is artificially inseminated, either by the
intended father or an anonymous donor, and carries the baby to term. The child is
thereby genetically related to both the surrogate mother, who provides the egg, and
the intended father or anonymous donor. In gestational surrogacy, an egg is removed
from the intended mother or an anonymous donor and fertilized with the sperm of the
intended father or anonymous donor."). In both processes, it follows that for same-
sex couples, only one of the parents can be genetically related to the child, since only
one of the eggs or sperm will produce the embryo. Gestational surrogacy is often
attractive to lesbian couples "because it permits one woman to contribute her egg and
the other to carry the child. Id.
17. See Michael J. Ritter, Note, Adoption by Same-Sex Couples: Public Policy Issues
in Texas Law & Practice, 15 TEx. J. C.L. & C.R. 235, 254 (2010 ) (outlining the debate over
the two main avenues of same-sex adoption: a joint adoption or a second-parent adoption
of the biological child of the other partner).
18. Jason C. Beekman, In Search of Parity: Child Custody/Visitation and Child Sup-
port for Lesbian Couples Under "Companion" Cases Debra H. and In re H.M. 23 (May 15,
2011) (unpublished graduate paper, Cornell Law School), available at http://scholarship.
law.cornell.edu/lps-papers/27.
19. The difficulties surrounding same-sex adoption and parentage have been ad-
dressed in pop culture as well. In HBO's critically acclaimed series, The Wire, Detective
Shakima "Kima" Greggs reluctantly has a child with her partner. The Wire (HBO televi-
sion broadcast 2002-2008). Not long after the birth of the child, the couple separated, and
Kima devoted the majority of her time to her work. Id. Once Kima received a significant
bonus, she took a child support check to her former partner and said, "thanks for not
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legal rights regarding parents' obligations to their children, many states
do not recognize same-sex marriage, 2 0 and therefore the state-run agen-
cies that enforce child support and visitation rights do not accept cases
involving children of same-sex couples. 2 1 Without having the state inter-
vene on behalf of the child's interest, many couples that want a remedy to
this frequently occurring problem are left with private litigation, which is
both costly and uncertain. 2 2 Ultimately, the children of same-sex unions
are left without the financial or emotional support of one of the parents,
and with significantly fewer rights than children from opposite-sex
unions.
Part II of this Comment will provide a legal background for child sup-
port, including the requirements for states as set forth by the Uniform
Interstate Family Support Act.2 Since the Federal Government has left
the states to determine the method of child support available, Part II will
also explore how the state of Texas, as a model, has implemented the
federal regulations.
Part III will explore the laws in a few select states that have defense of
marriage acts versus those that do not, specifically Texas, Missouri, New
York, California, Montana, Wisconsin, and Ohio. Part III will also dis-
cuss the various problems that arise for families as a result of the current
laws. The primary issues that affect these couples include conservator-
ship, visitation, and child support payment problems. Currently, state
courts are responsible for determining the legality of establishing and en-
coming after me for this." Id. Kima's former partner was an attorney, so it can be assumed
that she would take legal action had she continued not receiving child support from Kima.
Id. Later in the series, Kima begins to develop a relationship with her non-biological son,
including an overnight visit. Id. Luckily for the couple, they had an amicable separation,
with both parents actively participating in the way parents should; however, it is important
to note that this situation does not always happen and the litigation in this area is very
uncertain. Id.
20. See Chase D. Anderson, A Quest for Fair and Balanced: The Supreme Court, State
Courts, and The Future of Same-Sex Marriage Review After Perry, 60 DUKE L.J. 1413, 1432
(2010) (analyzing the legal perspectives of same-sex marriage, including a background of
the neutral standpoint the Supreme Court has taken thus far in "the culture war surround-
ing sexual orientation," and exploring current and future legal treatment of same-sex
marriage).
21. See State v. Naylor, 330 S.W.3d 434, 437 (Tex. App.-Austin 2011, pet. filed) (evi-
dencing Texas' opposition to litigation surrounding same-sex marriage, even the divorce of
a married couple, particularly noted by their insistence on intervening in this case regard-
less of the lack of a constitutional challenge or need to defend a Texas statute).
22. See Peeples v. Peeples, 562 S.W.2d 503, 506 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1978, no
writ) (demonstrating the cost of private litigation can easily be in the thousands).
23. See generally Uniform Interstate Family Support Act, 42 U.S.C. § 666(f) (2006)
(describing the procedures each state must enact into law in order to comply with the Act).
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forcing child support orders for same-sex couples when state law is am-
biguous and unsettled.
Part IV will propose that states should enact legislation that establishes
same-sex partners as legal parents with the same rights and responsibili-
ties to their children as opposite-sex partners. This solution would re-
move the burden from courts and provide for uniformity between the
states. Child support enforcement agencies would then be able to inter-
vene in cases involving children from same-sex unions, which would
lower the cost of private litigation that homosexual parents are currently
left with. Only then would the children of same-sex unions finally receive
the same benefits as children from heterosexual unions.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Child Support
1. Historical Background
In the early 1900s, the Federal Government was concerned about chil-
dren failing to get the financial support they deserved.24 With broken
families and single parents, children were suffering from one parent's fail-
ure to provide support.2 5 It was not until Congress passed the Social Se-
curity Act of 1975 that the Title IV-D concept was devised as a solution
to the child support problem. 26 The creation of the IV-D state agencies
however, was not without its problems. The idea was that agencies would
be established to serve families that were on welfare. Congress did not
want to exclude anyone from receiving these new services, so the IV-D
agency services were also offered to anyone not receiving government
financial assistance for a nominal fee.27 The difficulty with this concept
was that the agencies were underfunded and ill-equipped to handle the
demanding caseload.
Another issue arose when Congress enacted the Uniform Interstate
Family Support Act (UIFSA).29 UIFSA permits the state that originally
established the child support order to maintain jurisdiction over the order
24. See Daniel Robert Zmijewski, The Child Support Recovery Act and Its Constitu-
tionality after U.S. v. Morrison, NAT't. COAL. ioi Civ. Ris, 289, 290 (2009), http://www.
nccr.info/attachments/394_zmijewski.pdf (detailing the Aid to Families with Dependent
Children Act, also known as welfare).
25. Id Often, the children's fathers were disabled, deceased, or had abandoned their
families. Id.
26. Id. at 291.
27. Id. at 292.
28. Id. The so-called solution quickly became a "bureaucratic nightmare" because of
case overload and incongruent state systems. Id.
29. Uniform Interstate Family Support Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 666(f) (2007).
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regardless of whether the person subject to the order moved to another
state.o It became apparent that the states needed to be able to rely on
some sort of criminal action in order to properly enforce child support
actions against non-paying parents because each state applied its respec-
tive penal codes, which were not always the same." Congress responded
in 1992 with the Child Support Recovery Act (CSRA),32 and in 1998 with
the Deadbeat Parent's Punishment Act (DPPA)." The CSRA imposed
criminal sanctions against parents who failed to pay child support across
state lines.34 The DPPA made punishments much more stringent for non-
paying parents and imposed a more severe maximum jail sentence. The
CSRA and DPPA are only applicable in circumstances in which the non-
custodial parent and the custodial parent live in different states. The
movement toward harsher punishments for non-supportive parents also
became a trend among state agencies because they could still set guide-
lines for cases where both the custodial and noncustodial parent contin-
ued to live in the same state. Therefore, federal guidelines had a
significant effect on the way the state legislatures set up their IV-D agen-
cies, as will be discussed below.
2. Federal Guidelines
The Federal Government set guidelines for states to establish IV-D
agencies that would oversee all aspects of child support, including estab-
lishing paternity, collecting and distributing child support, and enforcing
child support orders." The United States Code is the authority that set
30. Id.; Zmijewski, supra note 24, at 292. Jurisdiction over the person was established
by using long arm jurisdiction provisions. Id. See generally The Uniform Child Custody
Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, Tx. FAM. CODE §§ 152.001-152.317 (demonstrating
the state implementation of the federal act).
31. Zmijewski, supra note 24, at 293.
32. Child Support Recovery Act, 18 U.S.C. § 228 (1992).
33. Deadbeat Parents Punishment Act, 18 U.S.C. § 228 (1998). Zmijewski, supra note
24, at 293. When CSRA was passed, four million parents not paying support were "turned
into potential federal criminals." Id.
34. Child Support Recovery Act, 18 U.S.C. § 228 (1992). Zmijewski, supra note 24, at
293. The passing of this Act marked the first time in American history that failure to pay
child support across state lines was a federal criminal offense. Id.
35. Deadbeat Parents Punishment Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 228 (1998). Zmijewski, supra
note 24, at 293.
36. Zmijewski, supra note 24, at 294. Mr. Zmijewski argues that moving out of state is
not required for the CSRA and DPPA to take effect. Id. "For example, if a non-support-
ive parent's child is moved out of the state by the custodial parent and the non-supportive
parent remains in the original state and chooses not to pay support, then the parent can be
held liable under the CSRA and end up in jail." Id.
37. Id. at 295.
38. 42 U.S.C. § 654 (2009).
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A State plan for child and spousal support must-(1) provide that it shall be in effect
in all political subdivisions of the State; (2) provide for financial participation by the
State; (3) provide for the establishment or designation of a single and separate organi-
zational unit, which meets such staffing and organizational requirements as the Secre-
tary may by regulation prescribe, within the State to administer the plan; (4) provide
that the State will-(A) provide services relating to the establishment of paternity or
the establishment, modification, or enforcement of child support obligations, as appro-
priate, under the plan with respect to-(i) each child for whom (1) assistance is pro-
vided under the State program funded under part A of this subchapter, (ll) benefits or
services for foster care maintenance are provided under the State program funded
under part E of this subchapter, (ItI) medical assistance is provided under the State
plan approved under subchapter XIX of this chapter, or (IV) cooperation is required
pursuant to section 2015(1)(1) of Title 7, unless, in accordance with paragraph (29),
good cause or other exceptions exist; (ii) any other child, if an individual applies for
such services with respect to the child; and (B) enforce any support obligation estab-
lished with respect to-(i) a child with respect to whom the State provides services
under the plan; or (ii) the custodial parent of such a child; (5) provide that (A) in any
case in which support payments are collected for an individual with respect to whom
an assignment pursuant to section 608(a)(3) of this title is effective, such payments
shall be made to the State for distribution pursuant to section 657 of this title and shall
not be paid directly to the family, and the individual will be notified on a monthly
basis (or on a quarterly basis for so long as the Secretary determines with respect to a
State that requiring such notice on a monthly basis would impose an unreasonable
administrative burden) of the amount of the support payments collected, and (B) in
any case in which support payments are collected for an individual pursuant to the
assignment made under section 1396k of this title, such payments shall be made to the
State for distribution pursuant to section 1396k of this title, except that this clause
shall not apply to such payments for any month after the month in which the individ-
ual ceases to be eligible for medical assistance; (6) provide that-(A) services under
the plan shall be made available to residents of other States on the same terms as to
residents of the State submitting the plan; (B)(i) an application fee for furnishing such
services shall be imposed on an individual, other than an individual receiving assis-
tance under a State program funded under part or E of this subchapter, or under a
State plan approved under subchapter XIX of this chapter, or who is required by the
State to cooperate with the State agency administering the program under this part
pursuant to subsection (1) or (m) of section 2015 of Title 7, and shall be paid by the
individual applying for such services, or recovered from the absent parent, or paid by
the State out of its own funds (the payment of which from State funds shall not be
considered as an administrative cost of the State for the operation of the plan, and
shall be considered income to the program), the amount of which (1) will not exceed
$25 (or such higher or lower amount (which shall be uniform for all States) as the
Secretary may determine to be appropriate for any fiscal year to reflect increases or
decreases in administrative costs), and (1l) may vary among such individuals on the
basis of ability to pay (as determined by the State); and (ii) in the case of an individual
who has never received assistance under a State program funded under part A of this
subchapter and for whom the State has collected at least $500 of support, the State
shall impose an annual fee of $25 for each case in which services are furnished, which
shall be retained by the State from support collected on behalf of the individual (but
not from the first $500 so collected), paid by the individual applying for the services,
recovered from the absent parent, or paid by the State out of its own funds (the pay-
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ment of which from State funds shall not be considered as an administrative cost of
the State for the operation of the plan, and the fees shall be considered income to the
program). Id. (7) provide for entering into cooperative arrangements with appropri-
ate courts and law enforcement officials and Indian tribes or tribal organizations (as
defined in subsections (e) and (1) of section 450b of Title 25) (A) to assist the agency
administering the plan, including the entering into of financial arrangements with such
courts and officials in order to assure optimum results under such program, and (B)
with respect to any other matters of common concern to such courts or officials and
the agency administering the plan; (8) provide that, for the purpose of establishing
parentage, establishing, setting the amount of, modifying, or enforcing child support
obligations, or making or enforcing a child custody or visitation determination, as de-
fined in section 663(d)(1) of this title, the agency administering the plan will establish
a service to locate parents utilizing-(A) all sources of information and available
records; and (B) the Federal Parent Locator Service established under section 653 of
this title, and shall, subject to the privacy safeguards required under paragraph (26),
disclose only the information described in sections 653 and 663 of this title to the
authorized persons specified in such sections for the purposes specified in such sec-
tions; (9) provide that the State will, in accordance with standards prescribed by the
Secretary, cooperate with any other State-(A) in establishing paternity, if necessary;
(B) in locating a noncustodial parent residing in the State (whether or not perma-
nently) against whom any action is being taken under a program established under a
plan approved under this part in another State; (C) in securing compliance by a non-
custodial parent residing in such State (whether or not permanently) with an order
issued by a court of competent jurisdiction against such parent for the support and
maintenance of the child or children or the parent of such child or children with re-
spect to whom aid is being provided under the plan of such other State; (D) in carry-
ing out other functions required under a plan approved under this part; and (E) not
later than March 1, 1997, in using the forms promulgated pursuant to section
652(a)(11) of this title for income withholding, imposition of liens, and issuance of
administrative subpoenas in interstate child support cases; 10) provide that the State
will maintain a full record of collections and disbursements made under the plan and
have an adequate reporting system; (11)(A) provide that amounts collected as support
shall be distributed as provided in section 657 of this title; and (B) provide that any
payment required to be made under section 656 or 657 of this title to a family shall be
made to the resident parent, legal guardian, or caretaker relative having custody of or
responsibility for the child or children; (12) provide for the establishment of proce-
dures to require the State to provide individuals who are applying for or receiving
services under the State plan, or who are parties to cases in which services are being
provided under the State plan-(A) with notice of all proceedings in which support
obligations might be established or modified; and (B) with a copy of any order estab-
lishing or modifying a child support obligation, or (in the case of a petition for modifi-
cation) a notice of determination that there should be no change in the amount of the
child support award, within 14 days after issuance of such order or determination; (13)
provide that the State will comply with such other requirements and standards as the
Secretary determines to be necessary to the establishment of an effective program for
locating noncustodial parents, establishing paternity, obtaining support orders, and
collecting support payments and provide that information requests by parents who are
residents of other States be treated with the same priority as requests by parents who
are residents of the State submitting the plan; (14)(A) comply with such bonding re-
quirements, for employees who receive, disburse, handle, or have access to, cash, as
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the Secretary shall by regulations prescribe; (B) maintain methods of administration
which are designed to assure that persons responsible for handling cash receipts shall
not participate in accounting or operating functions which would permit them to con-
ceal in the accounting records the misuse of cash receipts (except that the Secretary
shall by regulations provide for exceptions to this requirement in the case of sparsely
populated areas where the hiring of unreasonable additional staff would otherwise be
necessary); (15) provide for-(A) a process for annual reviews of and reports to the
Secretary on the State program operated under the State plan approved under this
part, including such information as may be necessary to measure State compliance
with Federal requirements for expedited procedures, using such standards and proce-
dures as are required by the Secretary, under which the State agency will determine
the extent to which the program is operated in compliance with this part; and (B) a
process of extracting from the automated data processing system required by para-
graph (16) and transmitting to the Secretary data and calculations concerning the
levels of accomplishment (and rates of improvement) with respect to applicable per-
formance indicators (including paternity establishment percentages) to the extent nec-
essary for purposes of sections 652(g) and 658a of this title; (16) provide, for the
establishment and operation by the State agency in accordance with an (initial and
annually updated) advance automated data processing planning document approved
under section 652(d) of this title, of a statewide automated data processing and infor-
mation retrieval system meeting the requirements of section 654a of this title designed
effectively and efficiently to assist management in the administration of the State plan,
so as to control, account for, and monitor all the factors in the support enforcement
collection and paternity determination process under such plan; (17) provide that the
State will have in effect an agreement with the Secretary entered into pursuant to
section 663 of this title for the use of the Parent Locator Service established under
section 653 of this title, and provide that the State will accept and transmit to the
Secretary requests for information authorized under the provisions of the agreement
to be furnished by such Service to authorized persons, will impose and collect (in
accordance with regulations of the Secretary) a fee sufficient to cover the costs to the
State and to the Secretary incurred by reason of such requests, will transmit to the
Secretary from time to time (in accordance with such regulations) so much of the fees
collected as are attributable to such costs to the Secretary so incurred, and during the
period that such agreement is in effect will otherwise comply with such agreement and
regulations of the Secretary with respect thereto; (18) provide that the State has in
effect procedures necessary to obtain payment of past-due support from overpay-
ments made to the Secretary of the Treasury as set forth in section 664 of this title, and
take all steps necessary to implement and utilize such procedures; (19) provide that
the agency administering the plan-(A) shall determine on a periodic basis, from infor-
mation supplied pursuant to section 508 of the Unemployment Compensation
Amendments of 1976, whether any individuals receiving compensation under the
State's unemployment compensation law (including amounts payable pursuant to any
agreement under any Federal unemployment compensation law) owe child support
obligations which are being enforced by such agency; and (B) shall enforce any such
child support obligations which are owed by such an individual but are not being
met-(i) through an agreement with such individual to have specified amounts with-
held from compensation otherwise payable to such individual and by submitting a
copy of any such agreement to the State agency administering the unemployment
compensation law; or (ii) in the absence of such an agreement, by bringing legal pro-
cess (as defined in section 659(i)(5) of this title) to require the withholding of amounts
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from such compensation; (20) provide, to the extent required by section 666 of this
title, that the State (A) shall have in effect all of the laws to improve child support
enforcement effectiveness which are referred to in that section, and (B) shall imple-
ment the procedures which are prescribed in or pursuant to such laws; (21)(A) at the
option of the State, impose a late payment fee on all overdue support (as defined in
section 666(e) of this title) under any obligation being enforced under this part, in an
amount equal to a uniform percentage determined by the State (not less than 3 per-
cent nor more than 6 percent) of the overdue support, which shall be payable by the
noncustodial parent owing the overdue support; and (B) assure that the fee will be
collected in addition to, and only after full payment of, the overdue support, and that
the imposition of the late payment fee shall not directly or indirectly result in a de-
crease in the amount of the support which is paid to the child (or spouse) to whom, or
on whose behalf, it is owed; (22) in order for the State to be eligible to receive any
incentive payments under Section 658a of this title, provide that, if one or more politi-
cal subdivisions of the State participate in the costs of carrying out activities under the
State plan during any period, each such subdivision shall be entitled to receive an
appropriate share (as determined by the State) of any such incentive payments made
to the State for such period, taking into account the efficiency and effectiveness of the
activities carried out under the State plan by such political subdivision; (23) provide
that the State will regularly and frequently publicize, through public service announce-
ments, the availability of child support enforcement services under the plan and other-
wise, including information as to any application fees for such services and a telephone
number or postal address at which further information may be obtained and will pub-
licize the availability and encourage the use of procedures for voluntary establishment
of paternity and child support by means the State deems appropriate; (24) provide
that the State will have in effect an automated data processing and information re-
trieval system-(A) by October 1, 1997, which meets all requirements of this part
which were enacted on or before October 13, 1988; and (B) by October 1, 2000, which
meets all requirements of this part enacted on or before August 22, 1996, except that
such deadline shall be extended by 1 day for each day (if any) by which the Secretary
fails to meet the deadline imposed by section 344(a)(3) of the Personal Responsibility
and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996; (25) provide that if a family with
respect to which services are provided under the plan ceases to receive assistance
under the State program funded under part A of this subchapter, the State shall pro-
vide appropriate notice to the family and continue to provide such services, subject to
the same conditions and on the same basis as in the case of other individuals to whom
services are furnished under the plan, except that an application or other request to
continue services shall not be required of such a family and paragraph (6)(B) shall not
apply to the family; (26) have in effect safeguards, applicable to all confidential infor-
mation handled by the State agency, that are designed to protect the privacy rights of
the parties, including-(A) safeguards against unauthorized use or disclosure of infor-
mation relating to proceedings or actions to establish paternity, or to establish, mod-
ify, or enforce support, or to make or enforce a child custody determination; (B)
prohibitions against the release of information on the whereabouts of 1 party or the
child to another party against whom a protective order with respect to the former
party or the child has been entered; (C) prohibitions against the release of information
on the whereabouts of 1 party or the child to another person if the State has reason to
believe that the release of the information to that person may result in physical or
emotional harm to the party or the child; (D) in cases in which the prohibitions under
subparagraphs (B) and (C) apply, the requirement to notify the Secretary, for pur-
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poses of section 653(b)(2) of this title, that the State has reasonable evidence of do-
mestic violence or child abuse against a party or the child and that the disclosure of
such information could be harmful to the party or the child; and (E) procedures pro-
viding that when the Secretary discloses information about a parent or child to a State
court or an agent of a State court described in section 653(c)(2) or 663(d)(2)(B) of this
title, and advises that court or agent that the Secretary has been notified that there is
reasonable evidence of domestic violence or child abuse pursuant to section 653(b)(2)
of this title, the court shall determine whether disclosure to any other person of infor-
mation received from the Secretary could be harmful to the parent or child and, if the
court determines that disclosure to any other person could be harmful, the court and
its agents shall not make any such disclosure; (27) provide that, on and after October
1, 1998, the State agency will-(A) operate a State disbursement unit in accordance
with section 654b of this title; and (B) have sufficient State staff (consisting of State
employees) and (at State option) contractors reporting directly to the State agency
to-(i) monitor and enforce support collections through the unit in cases being en-
forced by the State pursuant to paragraph 4 (including carrying out the automated
data processing responsibilities described in section 654a(g) of this title); and (ii) take
the actions described in section 666(c)(1) of this title in appropriate cases; (28) provide
that, on and after October 1, 1997, the State will operate a State Directory of New
Hires in accordance with section 653a of this title; (29) provide that the State agency
responsible for administering the State plan-(A) shall make the determination (and
redetermination at appropriate intervals) as to whether an individual who has applied
for or is receiving assistance under the State program funded under part A of this
subchapter, the State program under part E of this subchapter, the State program
under subchapter XIX of this chapter, or the supplemental nutrition assistance pro-
gram, as defined under section 2012(1) of Title 7, is cooperating in good faith with the
State in establishing the paternity of, or in establishing, modifying, or enforcing a sup-
port order for, any child of the individual by providing the State agency with the name
of, and such other information as the State agency may require with respect to, the
noncustodial parent of the child, subject to good cause and other exceptions which-
(i) in the case of the State program funded under part A of this subchapter, the State
program under part E of this subchapter, or the State program under subchapter XIX
of this chapter shall, at the option of the State, be defined, taking into account the best
interests of the child, and applied in each case, by the State agency administering such
program; and (ii) in the case of the supplemental nutrition assistance program, as de-
fined under section 2012(1) of Title 7, shall be defined and applied in each case under
that program in accordance with section 2015(1)(2) of Title 7; (B) shall require the
individual to supply additional necessary information and appear at interviews, hear-
ings, and legal proceedings; (C) shall require the individual and the child to submit to
genetic tests pursuant to judicial or administrative order; (D) may request that the
individual sign a voluntary acknowledgment of paternity, after notice of the rights and
consequences of such an acknowledgment, but may not require the individual to sign
an acknowledgment or otherwise relinquish the right to genetic tests as a condition of
cooperation and eligibility for assistance under the State program funded under part
A of this subchapter, the State program under part E of this subchapter, the State
program under subchapter XIX of this chapter, or the supplemental nutrition assis-
tance program, as defined under section 2012(1) of Title 7; and (E) shall promptly
notify the individual and the State agency administering the State program funded
under part A of this subehapter, the State agency administering the State program
under part E of this subchapter, the State agency administering the State program
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the regulations for the states to follow when developing their plans. Sec-
tion 654 of the United States Code discusses some of the IV-D agency's
under subchapter XIX of this chapter, or the State agency administering the supple-
mental nutrition assistance program, as defined under section 2012(1) of Title 7, of
each such determination, and if noncooperation is determined, the basis therefore;
(30) provide that the State shall use the definitions established under section 652(a)(5)
of this title in collecting and reporting information as required under this part; (31)
provide that the State agency will have in effect a procedure for certifying to the Sec-
retary, for purposes of the procedure under section 652(k) of this title, determinations
that individuals owe arrearages of child support in an amount exceeding $2,500, under
which procedure-(A) each individual concerned is afforded notice of such determi-
nation and the consequences thereof, and an opportunity to contest the determina-
tion; and (B) the certification by the State agency is furnished to the Secretary in such
format, and accompanied by such supporting documentation, as the Secretary may
require; (32)(A) provide that any request for services under this part by a foreign
reciprocating country or a foreign country with which the State has an arrangement
described in section 659a(d) of this title shall be treated as a request by a State; (B)
provide, at State option, notwithstanding paragraph (4) or any other provision of this
part, for services under the plan for enforcement of a spousal support order not de-
scribed in paragraph (4)(B) entered by such a country (or subdivision); and (C) pro-
vide that no applications will be required from, and no costs will be assessed for such
services against, the foreign reciprocating country or foreign obligee (but costs may at
State option be assessed against the obligor); (33) provide that a State that receives
funding pursuant to section 628 of this title and that has within its borders Indian
country (as defined in section 1151 of Title 18) may enter into cooperative agreements
with an Indian tribe or tribal organization (as defined in subsections (e) and (1) of
section 450b of Title 25), if the Indian tribe or tribal organization demonstrates that
such tribe or organization has an established tribal court system or a Court of Indian
Offenses with the authority to establish paternity, establish, modify, or enforce sup-
port orders, or to enter support orders in accordance with child support guidelines
established or adopted by such tribe or organization, under which the State and tribe
or organization shall provide for the cooperative delivery of child support enforce-
ment services in Indian country and for the forwarding of all collections pursuant to
the functions performed by the tribe or organization to the State agency, or con-
versely, by the State agency to the tribe or organization, which shall distribute such
collections in accordance with such agreement; and (34) include an election by the
State to apply section 657(a)(2)(B) of this title or former section 657(a)(2)(B) of this
title (as in effect for the State immediately before the date this paragraph first applies
to the State) to the distribution of the amounts which are the subject of such sections
and, for so long as the State elects to so apply such former section, the amendments
made by subsection (b)(1) of section 7301 of the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 shall
not apply with respect to the State, notwithstanding subsection (e) of such section
7301. The State may allow the jurisdiction which makes the collection involved to
retain any application fee under paragraph (6)(B) or any late payment fee under para-
graph (21). Nothing in paragraph (33) shall void any provision of any cooperative
agreement entered into before August 22, 1996, nor shall such paragraph deprive any
State of jurisdiction over Indian country (as so defined) that is lawfully exercised
under section 1322 of Title 25.
Id.
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responsibilities. 39 In cases where a child is born out-of-wedlock, the IV-
D agency will establish the paternity, if necessary; if paternity has already
been assigned, the agency will use all resources, including a parent-loca-
tor to find the parent, commence a lawsuit, and retrieve the child support
that is owed.40 In addition, even though the IV-D agency is set up by the
state, it must comply with all applicable federal regulations.4 1 While the
regulations are both extensive and specific in their guidelines, they fail to
define situations, such as key procedural matters, where the IV-D agency
will intervene. The absence of such a concrete definition provides an op-
portunity for states to limit the function of IV-D agencies through de-
fense of marriage acts as discussed below.
3. State Implementation
Texas has established the IV-D agency as part of the responsibility of
the Attorney General and serves as an example of how some states have
incorporated federal guidelines.4 2 The Attorney General's office has the
authority to determine how child support should be collected and to en-
force child support orders through legal action.4 3 The services available
through the Office of the Attorney General are: parent locator, determi-
nation of paternity, establishment of child support and medical support,
review and modification of child support orders every three years, order
enforcement, and child support payment collection and distribution.4 4
39. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 654 (2009).
40. Id. § 654(8)-(9).
41. See id. § 654 (explaining what the individual state's plans must be regarding child
and spousal support).
42. See TEX. FAM. CODE § 231.001 (2008) (stating, "(t]he office of the attorney gen-
eral is designated as the state's Title IV-D agency.").
43. See id. § 231.002. The statute explains that the agency may: "(1) accept, transfer,
and expend funds, subject to the General Appropriations Act ... ; (2) adopt rules for the
provision of child support services; (3) initiate legal actions needed to implement this chap-
ter; and (4) enter into contracts or agreements necessary to administer this chapter." Id.
44. Id. § 231.101.
(a) The Title IV-D agency may provide all services required or authorized to be pro-
vided by Part D of Title IV of the federal Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. Section 651 et
seq.), including: (1) parent locator services; (2) paternity determination; (3) child sup-
port and medical support establishment; (4) review and adjustment of child support
orders; (5) enforcement of child support and medical support orders; and (6) collec-
tion and distribution of child support payments. (b) At the request of either the obli-
gee or obligor, the Title IV-D agency shall review a child support order once every
three years and, if appropriate, adjust the support amount to meet the requirements of
the child support guidelines under Chapter 154. (c) Except as notice is included in the
child support order, a party subject to a support order shall be provided notice not less
than once every three years of the party's right to request that the Title IV-D agency
review and, if appropriate, adjust the amount of ordered support. (d) The Title IV-D
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The agency services are available to anyone in the state, "without regard
to whether the child has received public assistance."45 In addition to es-
tablishing paternity and child support orders, the agency also collects
child support payments through the noncustodial parent's employer or
other means, such as collecting tax returns. This is done in order to dis-
tribute the funds to the custodial parent.4 6 There are no regulations dic-
tating how the custodial parent must use the funds collected, except that
agency may review a support order at any time on a showing of a material and sub-
stantial change in circumstances, taking into consideration the best interests of the
child. (e) The Title IV-D agency shall distribute a child support payment received by
the agency from an employer within two working days after the date the agency re-
ceives the payment.
Id.
45. Id. § 231.102. "The Title IV-D agency on application or as otherwise authorized
by law may provide services for the benefit of a child without regard to whether the child
has received public assistance." Id. Families who are receiving public assistance are auto-
matically included in the services through assignment of child support. See id. §231.104.
The statute states:
[t]o the extent authorized by federal law, the approval of an application for or the
receipt of financial assistance as provided by Chapter 31, Human Resources Code,
constitutes an assignment to the Title IV-D agency of any rights to support from any
other person that the applicant or recipient may have personally or for a child for
whom the applicant or recipient is claiming assistance.
Id. Also, "[a]n application for child services is an assignment of support rights to enable
the Title IV-D agency to establish and enforce child support and medical support obliga-
tions, but an assignment is not a condition of eligibility for services." Id.
46. Id. § 159.310.
(a) The Title IV-D agency is the state information agency under this chapter. (b) The
state information agency shall: (1) compile and maintain a current list, including ad-
dresses, of the tribunals in this state that have jurisdiction under this chapter and any
support enforcement agencies in this state and send a copy to the state information
agency of every other state; (2) maintain a register of names and addresses of tribunals
and support enforcement agencies received from other states; (3) forward to the ap-
propriate tribunal in the county in this state where the obligee who is an individual or
the obligor resides, or where the obligor's property is believed to be located, all docu-
ments concerning a proceeding under this chapter received from an initiating tribunal
or the state information agency of the initiating state; and (4) obtain information con-
cerning the location of the obligor and the obligor's property in this state not exempt
from execution, by such means as postal verification and federal or state locator ser-
vices, examination of telephone directories, requests for the obligor's address from
employers, and examination of governmental records, including, to the extent not pro-
hibited by other law, those relating to real property, vital statistics, law enforcement,
taxation, motor vehicles, driver's licenses, and social security.
Id. "The Title IV-D agency shall maintain a toll-free telephone number at which personnel
are available during normal business hours to answer questions from employers responsi-
ble for withholding child support. The Title IV-D agency shall inform employers about the
toll-free telephone number." Id.
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the custodial parent is expected to use the funds for the child.4 7 As previ-
ously stated, Congress became more stringent in enforcing laws regarding
failure to provide child support." The Office of the Attorney General
47. See id. § 234.007 (discussing the notice of place of payment, and once it has been
distributed to the custodial parent, it is up to them to decide how to spend it).
(a) The Title IV-D agency shall notify the courts that the state disbursement unit has
been established. After receiving notice of the establishment of the state disburse-
ment unit, a court that orders income to be withheld for child support shall order that
all income withheld for child support be paid to the state disbursement unit. (b) In
order to redirect payments from a local registry to the state disbursement unit after
the date of the establishment of the state disbursement unit, the Title IV-D agency
shall issue a notice of place of payment informing the obligor, obligee, and employer
that income withheld for child support is to be paid to the state disbursement unit. (c)
A copy of the notice under Subsection (b) shall be filed with the court of continuing
jurisdiction and with the local child support registry. (d) The notice under Subsection
(b) must include: (1) the name of the child for whom support is ordered and of the
person to whom support is ordered by the court to be paid; (2) the style and cause
number of the case in which support is ordered; and (3) instructions for the payment
of ordered support to the state disbursement unit. (e) On receipt of a copy of the
notice under Subsection (b), the clerk of the court shall file the notice in the appropri-
ate case file. (f) The notice under Subsection (b) may be used by the Title IV-D
agency to redirect child support payments from the state disbursement unit of this
state to the state disbursement unit of another state.
Id. See also id. § 234.008 (discussing the deposit, distribution and issuance of payment).
(a) Not later than the second business day after the date the state disbursement unit
receives a child support payment, the state disbursement unit shall distribute the pay-
ment to the Title IV-D agency or the obligec. (b) The state disbursement unit shall
deposit daily all child support payments in a trust fund with the state comptroller.
Subject to the agreement of the comptroller, the state disbursement unit may issue
checks from the trust fund.
Id. See also id. § 234.009 (discussing the official child support payment record).
(a) The record of child support payments maintained by a local registry is the official
record of a payment received directly by the local registry. (b) The record of child
support payments maintained by the state disbursement unit is the official record of a
payment received directly by the unit. (c) After the date child support payments for-
merly received by a local registry are redirected to the state disbursement unit, a local
registry may accept a record of payments furnished by the state disbursement unit and
may add the payments to the record of payments maintained by the local registry so
that a complete payment record is available for use by the court. (d) If the local
registry does not add payments received by the state disbursement unit to the record
maintained by the registry as provided by Subsection (c), the official record of child
support payments consists of the record maintained by the local registry for payments
received directly by the registry and the record maintained by the state disbursement
unit for payments received directly by the unit.
Id.
48. See TEX. FAM. CODE § 234.007 (2008) (explaining the duties of the noncustodial
parent to the state).
(a) A person obligated to pay child support in a case in which the Title IV-D agency is
providing services under this chapter who does not pay the required support is in-
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Child Support Division employs various child support officers whose job
it is to collect child support payments from non-paying noncustodial par-
ents.4 9 In addition to child support officers, the agency employs attorneys
who institute legal action against the non-paying, noncustodial parents.50
debted to the state for the purposes of Section 403.055, Government Code, if the Title
IV-D agency has reported the person to the comptroller under that section properly.
(b) The amount of a person's indebtedness to the state under Subsection (a) is equal
to the sum of: (1) the amount of the required child support that has not been paid; and
(2) any interest, fees, court costs, or other amounts owed by the person because the
person has not paid the support. (c) The Title IV-D agency is the sole assignee of all
payments, including payments of compensation, by the state to a person indebted to
the state under Subsection (a). (d) On request of the Title IV-D agency: (1) the comp-
troller shall make payable and deliver to the agency any payments for which the
agency is the assignee under Subsection (c), if the comptroller is responsible for issu-
ing warrants or initiating electronic funds transfers to make those payments; and (2) a
state agency shall make payable and deliver to the Title IV-D agency any payments for
which the Title IV-D agency is the assignee under Subsection (c) if the comptroller is
not responsible for issuing warrants or initiating electronic funds transfers to make
those payments. (e) A person indebted to the state under Subsection (a) may elimi-
nate the debt by: (1) paying the entire amount of the debt; or (2) resolving the debt in
a manner acceptable to the Title IV-D agency. (f) The comptroller or a state agency
may rely on a representation by the Title IV-D agency that: (1) a person is indebted to
the state under Subsection (a); or (2) a person who was indebted to the state under
Subsection (a) has eliminated the debt.
Id.
49. Id. § 159.310.
50. Id. § 231.109.
(a) Attorneys employed by the Title IV-D agency may represent this state or another
state in an action brought under the authority of federal law or this chapter. (b) The
Title IV-D agency may contract with private attorneys, other private entities, or politi-
cal subdivisions of the state to provide services in Title IV-D cases. (c) The Title IV-D
agency shall provide copies of all contracts entered into under this section to the Leg-
islative Budget Board and the Governor's Office of Budget and Planning, along with a
written justification of the need for each contract, within 60 days after the execution of
the contract. (d) An attorney employed to provide Title IV-D services represents the
interest of the state and not the interest of any other party. The provision of services
by an attorney under this chapter does not create an attorney-client relationship be-
tween the attorney and any other party. The agency shall, at the time an application
for child support services is made, inform the applicant that neither the Title IV-D
agency nor any attorney who provides services under this chapter is the applicant's
attorney and that the attorney providing services under this chapter does not provide
legal representation to the applicant. (e) An attorney employed by the Title IV-D
agency or as otherwise provided by this chapter may not be appointed or act as an
amicus attorney or attorney ad litem for a child or another party.
Id. Such legal action may result in jail time in cases where retroactive support has accrued
over time and the noncustodial parent has a history of nonpayment. Attorney General of
Texas, Child Support Enforcement Brings Hope to Texas Families, (Jan. 3, 2008), https://
www.oag.state.tx.us/alerts/alerts-view.php?id=1 78&type=3.
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The Office of the Attorney General also provides referral to employ-
ment programs for noncustodial parents who are unemployed and there-
fore unable to provide the support ordered.5 ' All of these state-run
benefits come from the formation of the Title IV-D agency, and are pro-
vided to families who qualify under state eligibility requirements.s2
4. Visitation and Conservatorship
Similar to the way that states have established child support collection
processes, state IV-D agencies also have the authority to regulate visita-
51. TEx. FAM. § 231.117.
(a) The Title IV-D agency shall refer to appropriate state and local entities that pro-
vide employment services any unemployed or underemployed obligor who is in ar-
rears in court-ordered child support payments. (b) A referral under Subsection (a)
may include: (1) skills training and job placement through: (A) the Texas Workforce
Commission; or (B) the agency responsible for the food stamp employment and train-
ing program (7 U.S.C. Section 2015(d)); (2) referrals to education and literacy classes;
and (3) counseling regarding: (A) substance abuse; (B) parenting skills; (C) life skills;
and (D) mediation techniques. (c) The Title IV-D agency may require an unemployed
or underemployed obligor to complete the training, classes, or counseling to which the
obligor is referred under this section. The agency shall suspend under Chapter 232 the
license of an obligor who fails to comply with the requirements of this subsection. (d)
A court or the Title IV-D agency may issue an order that requires the parent to either
work, have a plan to pay overdue child support, or participate in work activities appro-
priate to pay the overdue support.
Id. Despite the non-custodial parents unemployment, the court can still order child sup-
port and the calculation of the amount due is based on a minimum wage presumption. The
choices program is a way for the Attorney General's office to provide assistance to the
noncustodial parent to obtain employment and consequently make their child support pay-
ments thus fulfilling their financial obligations as parents. NCP Choices, ArroRNviY GEN.
or, TEx., https:/Iwww.oag.state.tx.us/cs/parents/faq.shtml#apply (last visited June 24, 2012).
52. Attorney General of Texas, Child Support: Frequently Asked Questions, (Dec. 9,
2011), https://www.oag.state.tx.us/cs/parents/faq.shtml#apply.
The Attorney General's office accepts applications from mothers, fathers and other
individuals who request services. Our attorneys represent the State of Texas in pro-
viding child support services and do not represent either parent in the case. Custom-
ers do not have the right to select what enforcement actions are taken in their cases.
The Office of the Attorney General is required to provide all appropriate services for
the benefit of the children. Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) and
certain Medicaid recipients automatically receive child support services after they are
certified for public assistance. Persons who do not receive TANF or Medicaid must
apply for child support services. There is no charge to apply for child support services.
Many services are provided at no cost. Effective October 1, 2011, custodial parents
with full-service cases who have never received TANF will pay a $25 fee each year that
they receive at least $500 in child support collections. Fees will be deducted from child
support payments. Parents who have more than one child support case will pay a fee
on each case that meets the criteria.
Id.
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tion and conservatorship.s" Rights of visitation are primarily the concern
of the noncustodial parent because those rights allow the noncustodial
parent particular times to see his or her children. 5 4 There are two types
53. See TiEx. FAM. § 203.004.
(a) A domestic relations office may: (1) collect and disburse child support payments
that are ordered by a court to be paid through a domestic relations registry; (2) main-
tain records of payments and disbursements made under Subdivision (1); (3) file a
suit, including a suit to: (A) establish paternity; (B) enforce a court order for child
support or for possession of and access to a child; and (C) modify or clarify an existing
child support order; (4) provide an informal forum in which alternative dispute resolu-
tion is used to resolve disputes under this code; (5) prepare a court-ordered social
study under Chapter 107; (6) represent a child as an amicus attorney, an attorney ad
litem, or a guardian ad litem in a suit in which: (A) termination of the parent-child
relationship is sought; or (B) conservatorship of or access to a child is contested; (7)
serve as a friend of the court; (8) provide pre-divorce counseling ordered by a court;
(9) provide community supervision services under Chapter 157; (10) provide informa-
tion to assist a party in understanding, complying with, or enforcing the party's duties
and obligations under Subdivision (3); (11) provide, directly or through a contract,
visitation services, including supervision of court-ordered visitation, visitation ex-
change, or other similar services; (12) issue an administrative writ of withholding
under Subchapter F, Chapter 158; and (13) provide parenting coordinator services
under Chapter 153. (b) A court having jurisdiction in a proceeding under this title,
Title 3, or Section 25.05, Penal Code, may order that child support payments be made
through a domestic relations office. (c) A domestic relations office may: (1) hire or
contract for the services of attorneys to assist the office in providing services under
this chapter; and (2) employ community supervision officers or court monitors.
Id.
54. Id. § 151.001.
(a) A parent of a child has the following rights and duties: (1) the right to have physi-
cal possession, to direct the moral and religious training, and to designate the resi-
dence of the child; (2) the duty of care, control, protection, and reasonable discipline
of the child; (3) the duty to support the child, including providing the child with cloth-
ing, food, shelter, medical and dental care, and education; (4) the duty, except when a
guardian of the child's estate has been appointed, to manage the estate of the child,
including the right as an agent of the child to act in relation to the child's estate if the
child's action is required by a state, the United States, or a foreign government; (5)
except as provided by Section 264.0111, the right to the services and earnings of the
child; (6) the right to consent to the child's marriage, enlistment in the armed forces of
the United States, medical and dental care, and psychiatric, psychological, and surgical
treatment; (7) the right to represent the child in legal action and to make other deci-
sions of substantial legal significance concerning the child; (8) the right to receive and
give receipt for payments for the support of the child and to hold or disburse funds for
the benefit of the child; (9) the right to inherit from and through the child; (10) the
right to make decisions concerning the child's education; and (11) any other right or
duty existing between a parent and child by virtue of law. (b) The duty of a parent to
support his or her child exists while the child is an unemancipated minor and contin-
ues as long as the child is fully enrolled in a secondary school in a program leading
toward a high school diploma and complies with attendance requirements described
by Section 154.002(a)(2). (c) A parent who fails to discharge the duty of support is
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of conservatorships that manage the amount of input a parent has in
making decisions on behalf of his or her children." The first type of con-
servatorship is sole-managing conservatorship, which enables the custo-
dial parent to make decisions regarding the child without consulting the
noncustodial parent.56 The second type of conservatorship is joint-man-
aging conservatorship, which requires the custodial parent to consult with
the non-custodial parent before making decisions about the child." Title
liable to a person who provides necessaries to those to whom support is owed. (d) The
rights and duties of a parent are subject to: (1) a court order affecting the rights and
duties; (2) an affidavit of relinquishment of parental rights; and (3) an affidavit by the
parent designating another person or agency to act as managing conservator. (e) Only
the following persons may use corporal punishment for the reasonable discipline of a
child: (1) a parent or grandparent of the child; (2) a stepparent of the child who has
the duty of control and reasonable discipline of the child; and (3) an individual who is
a guardian of the child and who has the duty of control and reasonable discipline of
the child.
Id.
55. Id. § 153.005.
(a) In a suit, the court may appoint a sole managing conservator or may appoint joint
managing conservators. If the parents are or will be separated, the court shall appoint
at least one managing conservator. (b) A managing conservator must be a parent, a
competent adult, an authorized agency, or a licensed child-placing agency.
Id.
56. Id. § 153.132.
Unless limited by court order, a parent appointed as sole managing conservator of a
child has the rights and duties provided by Subchapter B and the following exclusive
rights: (1) the right to designate the primary residence of the child; (2) the right to
consent to medical, dental, and surgical treatment involving invasive procedures; (3)
the right to consent to psychiatric and psychological treatment; (4) the right to receive
and give receipt for periodic payments for the support of the child and to hold or
disburse these funds for the benefit of the child; (5) the right to represent the child in
legal action and to make other decisions of substantial legal significance concerning
the child; (6) the right to consent to marriage and to enlistment in the armed forces of
the United States; (7) the right to make decisions concerning the child's education; (8)
the right to the services and earnings of the child; and (9) except when a guardian of
the child's estate or a guardian or attorney ad litem has been appointed for the child,
the right to act as an agent of the child in relation to the child's estate if the child's
action is required by a state, the United States, or a foreign government.
Id.
57. Id. § 153.134.
(a) If a written agreed parenting plan is not filed with the court, the court may render
an order appointing the parents joint managing conservators only if the appointment
is in the best interest of the child, considering the following factors: (1) whether the
physical, psychological, or emotional needs and development of the child will benefit
from the appointment of joint managing conservators; (2) the ability of the parents to
give first priority to the welfare of the child and reach shared decisions in the child's
best interest; (3) whether each parent can encourage and accept a positive relationship
between the child and the other parent; (4) whether both parents participated in child
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IV-D agencies often include provisions that establish conservatorship and
visitation rights in the same court that orders child support." This set-up
allows the order to apply to both parties; it orders child support for the
children who
live with the custodial parent, and establishes the noncustodial parent's
right to see the children and play a role in the decisions regarding the
children."
5. Defense of Marriage Act and Its Effect on IV-D Agencies
Since Congress passed the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) in 1996,
many states have passed their own defense of marriage acts that prohibit
same-sex couples from getting married.6o Because the states have the ul-
timate authority to establish the process for collecting child support, the
defense of marriage acts in each state have an effect on the other types of
services provided. For instance, Texas has a defense of marriage act, and
while the IV-D agency does not expressly prohibit child support enforce-
ment services from being provided to same-sex families, its effect inevita-
rearing before the filing of the suit; (5) the geographical proximity of the parents'
residences; (6) if the child is 12 years of age or older, the child's preference, if any,
regarding the person to have the exclusive right to designate the primary residence of
the child; and (7) any other relevant factor. (b) In rendering an order appointing joint
managing conservators, the court shall: (1) designate the conservator who has the ex-
clusive right to determine the primary residence of the child and: (A) establish, until
modified by further order, a geographic area within which the conservator shall main-
tain the child's primary residence; or (B) specify that the conservator may determine
the child's primary residence without regard to geographic location; (2) specify the
rights and duties of each parent regarding the child's physical care, support, and edu-
cation; (3) include provisions to minimize disruption of the child's education, daily
routine, and association with friends; (4) allocate between the parents, independently,
jointly, or exclusively, all of the remaining rights and duties of a parent as provided by
Chapter 151; and (5) if feasible, recommend that the parties use an alternative dispute
resolution method before requesting enforcement or modification of the terms and
conditions of the joint conservatorship through litigation, except in an emergency.
Id.
58. TEX. FAM. CODE § 153.005 (2006).
59. See id. § 153.193 (stating "[t]he terms of an order that denies possession of a child
to a parent or imposes restrictions or limitations on a parent's right to possession of or
access to a child may not exceed those that are required to protect the best interest of the
child.").
60. 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006). The Act defines "marriage" and "spouse" as follows:
In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any ruling, regulation, or
interpretation of the various administrative bureaus and agencies of the United States,
the word "marriage" means only a legal union between one man and one woman as
husband and wife, and the word "spouse" refers only to a person of the opposite sex
who is a husband or a wife.
Id.
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bly denies them services." The portion of the act that states that any
unions other than those of opposite-sex couples are void as against public
policy delegitimizes same-sex unions and same-sex marriages from other
states. 62 Regarding these unions as void has the effect of denying parents
and children from these unions the same state-run services that children
of opposite-sex unions receive.' In essence, Congress' attempts to advo-
cate for the rights of children and force non-supportive parents to meet
their financial obligations has simultaneously denied that same right to
equally deserving families.
III. THE CURRENT STATUS OF THE PROBLEM
Currently, there is no state legislation that specifically includes same-
sex couples and their children. In addition to excluding same-sex couples
from legislation, many state family codes include a provision that explains
that the state's laws pertaining to child support will honor all other state
laws-including defense of marriage acts." By including this provision,
61. TEX. FAM. § 6.204. "In this section, 'civil union' means any relationship other
than marriage that: (1) is intended as an alternative to marriage or applies primarily to
cohabitating persons; and (2) grants to the parties of the relationship legal protections,
benefits, or responsibilities granted to the spouses of a marriage." Id. The act goes further
to explain that "a marriage between person of the same-sex or a civil union is contrary to
the public policy of this state and is void in this State". Id. Also,
the state or an agency or policy subdivision of the state may not give effect to a: (1)
public act, record, or judicial proceeding that creates, recognizes, or validates a mar-
riage between persons of the same sex or a civil union in this state or in any other
jurisdiction; or (2) right or claim to any legal protection, benefit, or responsibility as-
serted as a result of a marriage between persons of the same sex or a civil union in this
state or in any other jurisdiction.
Id.
62. See id. (denying rights to same-sex couples and refusing to recognize the marriage
laws of other states help perpetuate the stigma against same-sex couples and their
children).
63. See id. (prohibiting state agencies from giving a same-sex couple any right or claim
to any legal protection, which would include a lawsuit for conservatorship or child
support).
64. Id. § 152.303.
(a) A court of this state shall recognize and enforce a child custody determination of a
court of another state if the latter court exercised jurisdiction in substantial conformity
with this chapter or the determination was made under factual circumstances meeting
the jurisdictional standards of this chapter and the determination has not been modi-
fied in accordance with this chapter. (b) A court of this state may utilize any remedy
available under other law of this state to enforce a child custody determination made
by a court of another state. The remedies provided in this subchapter are cumulative
and do not affect the availability of other remedies to enforce a child custody
determination.
Id.
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the state has established the inevitable denial of rights to same-sex
couples and their children. The first part of this analysis will explore the
current laws in several states and their failure to address the children of
same-sex couples. The second part of the analysis will explore possible
solutions to the problems outlined in this section.
At this time, children of same-sex couples have some of the same rights
that children of heterosexual couples have. For instance, a homosexual
parent who has adopted a child of no biological relation to herself pos-
sesses the same legal rights to the child as a biological parent.65 These
legal rights include the right to custody, and the responsibility of the non-
custodial parent to provide child support. A two-fold problem arises
when the non-biological parent has not formally adopted the child. In
this case, the non-biological parent cannot obtain the same rights to ac-
65. Id. § 102.003.
(a) An original suit may be filed at any time by: (1) a parent of the child; (2) the child
through a representative authorized by the court; (3) a custodian or person having the
right of visitation with or access to the child appointed by an order of a court of an-
other state or county; (4) a guardian of the person or of the estate of the child; (5) a
governmental entity; (6) an authorized agency; (7) a licensed child placing agency; (8)
a man alleging himself to be the father of a child filing in accordance with Chapter
160, subject to the limitations of that chapter, but not otherwise; (9) a person, other
than a foster parent, who has had actual care, control, and possession of the child for
at least six months ending not more than 90 days preceding the date of the filing of the
petition; (10) a person designated as the managing conservator in a revoked or unre-
voked affidavit of relinquishment under Chapter 161 or to whom consent to adoption
has been given in writing under Chapter 162; (11) a person with whom the child and
the child's guardian, managing conservator, or parent have resided for at least six
months ending not more than 90 days preceding the date of the filing of the petition if
the child's guardian, managing conservator, or parent is deceased at the time of the
filing of the petition; (12) a person who is a relative of the child within the third degree
by consanguinity, as determined by Chapter 573, Government Code, if the child's par-
ents are deceased at the time of the filing of the petition; or (14) a person who has
been named as a prospective adoptive parent of a child by a pregnant woman or the
parent of the child, in a verified written statement to confer standing executed under
Section 102.0035, regardless of whether the child has been born. (b) In computing the
time necessary for standing under Subsections (a)(9), (11), and (12), the court may not
require that the time be continuous and uninterrupted by shall consider the child's
principal residence during the relevant time preceding the date of commencement of
the suit. (c) Notwithstanding the time requirements of Subsection (a)(12), a person
who is a foster parent of a child may file suit to adopt a child for whom the person is
providing foster care at any time after the person has been approved to adopt the
child. The standing to file suit under this subsection applies only to the adoption of a
child who is eligible to be adopted.
Id.
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cess the child, and the biological partner is unable to establish support for
the child.6 6
Unfortunately, due to the uncertainty in this area of law, it is not un-
common for one parent to use legislation like a DOMA against the other
parent when litigating these matters. 7 In this situation, the partner who
wishes to deny the other partner visitation would argue that allowing
standing to file suit is void as against public policy in the state.68 The
same argument is used by former partners who are trying to escape from
child support obligations.6 9
Another problem that exists exclusively for same-sex is that they have
to pay for their legal services.o Title IV-D agencies will intervene in het-
erosexual disputes to establish child support and conservatorship, while
homosexual couples have to pay for private litigation, and outcomes in
these private proceedings are both unknown and costly.7
As a result of legislatures' and courts' failure to recognize changes to
the concept of a modern family, innocent children are being neglected.
Ideally, once a child is born to a couple, two loving parents surround him.
This is as true for same-sex couples as it is for heterosexual couples.
Sometimes however, the parents' union does not last, which leaves the
child with separated parents. In families where the parents are hetero-
sexual, the law is clear that each parent has an equal right to access the
child and has standing to file suit for conservatorship and visitation.' In
addition to having standing to file suit for access to the child, the hetero-
sexual custodial parent has equal standing in a court of law to file suit for
66. See TEX. FAM. CODE § 102.003 (2006) (explaining the various ways for a non-
biological parent to have standing to sue, which are oftentimes much more difficult to
prove.)
67. See Hobbs v. Van Stavern, 249 S.W.3d 1, 2-3 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
2006, no pet.) (arguing on one side that the adoptive parent did not have a right to be a
joint managing conservator of the child because it was void as against public policy in
Texas, but the court did not allow it).
68. Id.
69. In re H.M. v. E.T., 930 N.E.2d 206, 207-08 (N.Y. 2010).
70. See Peeples v. Peeples, 562 S.W.2d 503, 506 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1978, no
writ) (explaining that in a modification suit for child custody, the wife's attorney spent 82.9
hours on the case and charged $50.00 per hour, totaling $4,145.00). That case was over
thirty years ago, so a case brought today would cost considerably more because, due to
inflation, attorneys now charge more than $50.00 per hour.
71. Id. See generally TEx. FAM. CoDE § 231 (2008) (describing the services and objec-
tives of the IV-D program in the Texas Family Code). Since the state of Texas does not
recognize same-sex marriages, the provisions of the Texas Family Code do not apply to
homosexual couples, forcing them to seek alternative avenues to settle child support issues.
Id.
72. TEX. FAM. CODL § 102.003 (2006); Hobbs v. Van Stavern, 249 S.W.3d 1, 3 (Tex.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.).
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child support." Despite the unfortunate circumstances of a child growing
up with separated parents, a child from a heterosexual union is more
likely to receive support from both parents because the parents' rights are
defined and enforced by state legislatures and courts.
In a family where the parents are of the same-sex, state legislatures and
courts do not enforce the same rights and duties.7 4 Parents in these situa-
tions suffer, either from raising the child without support from the former
partner, or from not having any visitation rights to the child, but the child
suffers the ultimate harm by either not having a parent present in their
life or not having adequate financial support. In many states, once same-
sex parents separate, the child no longer has any support from the non-
custodial parent simply because the legislature and courts refuse to en-
force this right.
A. U.S. Supreme Court
In Troxel v. Granville," the Supreme Court considered the constitu-
tionality of a Washington statute that permitted any individual to sue for
visitation as long as it served the best interest of the child." The issue at
hand was whether the particular statute violated substantive due pro-
cess." In this situation, the paternal grandparents of the superior chil-
dren were awarded visitation against the mother's wishes because the
district court deemed the visitation to be in the best interest of the chil-
dren." The Supreme Court stated:
[T]he Due Process Clause does not permit a State to infringe on the
fundamental right of parents to make child rearing decisions simply
because a state judge believes a "better" decision could be made.
Neither the Washington nonparental visitation statute generally-
which places no limits on either the persons who may petition for
visitation or the circumstances in which such a petition may be
granted-nor the Superior Court in this specific case required any-
thing more.7 9
73. See Ti x. FAM. CODE § 154.001 (2006) (describing the general circumstances in
which the court adjudicates child support issues).
74. See White v. White, 293 S.W.3d 1, 6-7 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009) (refusing to allow
noncustodial former partner standing to sue).
75. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
76. WASH. Rev. CODE § 26.10.160(3), invalidated by Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57,
61 (2000). The statute permitted "[a]ny person" to petition for visitation rights "at any
time" and authorizes state superior courts to grant such rights whenever visitation may
serve a child's best interest. Id.
77. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65.
78. Id. at 61-62.
79. Id. at 72-73.
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The Court held the statute, as it was applied, was unconstitutional.so
This case, while not directly applicable to same-sex unions, indicates the
trouble that some legislatures might encounter with broadening the legis-
lation for child support, visitation, and conservatorship.8' Washington's
statute was too broad because the statute lacked specificity about who
had standing to sue.' Troxel demonstrates that legislatures must be cau-
tious when amending their current parent-child statutes.
B. Texas
Texas has a DOMA which states, "a marriage between persons of the
same sex or a civil union is contrary to the public policy of this state and is
void in this state."" Section 152.303 of the Texas Family Code discusses
child support obligations and states that the guidelines will also abide by
all other state laws." Section 6.204(c) prohibits a political subdivision or
state agency from giving any legal protection to claims asserted as a result
of same-sex marriage." By including this provision within the part of the
80. Id. at 73.
81. Id. "The constitutionality of any standard for awarding visitation turns on the
specific manner in which that standard is applied and that the constitutional protections in
this area are best 'elaborated with care."' Id. (quoting Justice Kennedy).
82. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 63 (2000).
83. TEx. FAM. CoiE § 6.204(b) (2006).
84. Tex. FAM. Coon. § 152.303 (2008).
85. Tiex. FAM. ConE § 6.204(c) (2006). See alo State v. Naylor, 330 S.W.3d 434, 436
(Tex. App.-Austin 2011, pet. filed) (holding that the State had no standing to appeal).
This case involved a lesbian couple who was married in Massachusetts, but moved back to
their home state, Texas, and adopted a child. Id. Since the couple resided in Texas for
almost seven years when they filed for divorce, they filed in a Texas state court. Id. A trial
court granted the divorce, but the State appealed based on the trial court's lack of subject
matter jurisdiction. Id. at 437. Specifically, the State argued that granting the divorce was
in violation of Section 6.204(c) of the Texas Family Code, which prohibited a "state agency
or political subdivision from giving effect to 'right or claim to any legal protection, benefit,
or responsibility asserted as a result' of same-sex marriage." Id. at 435-36.
The State treats Naylor's petition for divorce as an "implied" constitutional attack on
section 6.204 of the family code, reasoning that the trial court could not possibly have
granted the divorce without determining that section 6.204 is unconstitutional ... . We
decline to read an implied constitutional challenge into Naylor's petition for divorce
where no such challenge has been expressly raised, particularly given the potential for
interpreting section 6.204 in a manner that would allow the trial court to grant a di-
vorce in this case. One could argue, for example, that section 6.204 did not prohibit
the trial court's actions because divorce is a "benefit" of state residency, rather than a
"legal protection, benefit, or responsibility" resulting from marriage. See id. One
could also argue that under the plain language of section 6.204, the trial court is only
prohibited from taking actions that create, recognize, or give effect to same-sex mar-
riages on a "going-forward" basis, so that the granting of a divorce would be permissi-
ble. Naylor has in fact made both of these arguments, either on appeal or in response
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Texas Family Code that pertains to child support, the Texas State Legisla-
ture has denied the IV-D services to same-sex couples. 6 It is important
to note that non-biological parents can independently sue for visitation or
custody because the state statute outlining standing to file suits affecting
the parent-child relationship includes a person who has cared for the
child at least six months in the preceding ninety days to filing the suit, or
a person who has lived with the child and the child's parent for at least six
months in the preceding ninety days if the parent is deceased when the
petition is filed."
In Jones v. Fowler," the Texas Supreme Court held that a former part-
ner did not provide care for the child before filing her suit for visitation,
and therefore did not meet the statutory requirement." The Court ex-
plained that even though the legislature removed the word "immedi-
ately" before "preceding," the statute had the same effect, and it had
been too long since the former partner cared for the child for her to have
standing to file suit for visitation." The legislature has since added a pro-
vision that requires filing the suit "not more than 90 days" to remove
confusion, but the Jones opinion demonstrates the higher burden a for-
mer partner must meet in order to prove that she had a substantial rela-
tionship with the child." It is much easier for a biological parent or an
individual claiming to be a biological parent to have standing to sue.92
to the State's post-judgment plea to the jurisdiction. While we express no opinion on
the merit of these arguments, the fact remains that there are interpretations of section
6.204 that would allow the trial court to grant the divorce without finding the statute
unconstitutional. Furthermore, any such interpretation would have to be entertained
before a conclusion of unconstitutionality could be reached.
Id. at 441-42.
86. See State v. Naylor, 330 S.W.3d 434, 435 (Tex. App.-Austin 2011, pet. filed) (cit-
ing TiEX. FAM. CODE § 6.204(c)).
87. TEx. FAM. CODE § 102.003(a)(9) & (11) (West 2006).
88. Jones v. Fowler, 969 S. W.2d 429, 429 (Tex. 1998); see Robin Cheryl Miller, Child
Custody and Visitation Rights Arising from Same-sex Relationship, 80 A.L.R. 5th 1, § 7[a]
(originally published in 2000) (analyzing the Court's holding in the case).
89. Id. at 433.
90. Id. "We conclude that the Legislature did not intend a substantive change when it
deleted 'immediately' from 'immediately preceding' in section 102.003(9) of the Family
Code. Because Fowler does not meet the custody, control, and possession requirements of
this section, we hold that she does not have standing to seek visitation rights with the
child." Id.
91. Tix. FAM. CODE § 102.003(a)(9) (2011). The entire Subsection reads: "a person,
other than a foster parent, who has had actual care, control, and possession of the child for
at least six months ending not more than 90 days preceding the date of the filing of the
petition." Id.
92. TEX. FAM. CODE § 102.003(a)(1) (2011).
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While the current laws in Texas do not permit IV-D agencies to inter-
vene in child support cases for same-sex couples, there have been some
cases in which courts have indicated same-sex parents should have the
same rights and responsibilities to their children as opposite-sex parents.
In Hobbs v. Van Stavern,9 3 a former partner filed suit to establish herself
as a joint managing conservator for the couple's minor child.9 4 Hobbs
was the biological mother of the couple's daughter, and Van Stavern had
already legally adopted her when the couple separated."s The Court of
Appeals in Houston held the adoptive parent had standing to file a Suit
Affecting the Parent Child Relationship (SAPCR). Interestingly,
Hobbs asserted that the court could not permit an adoptive parent to file
a SAPCR because Texas did not recognize same-sex marriage, and al-
lowing Van Stavern to be a joint-managing conservator would violate
public policy.' In her pleading, Hobbs asserted, "entertainment and res-
olution of [Van Stavern's] SAPCR was in some manner tantamount to a
proclamation validating same-sex relationships."" As this case demon-
strates, unfortunately, due to various DOMAs enacted by different states,
biological parents are able to use these acts as weapons against the other
parent in court. The biological parent uses the act to deny the other par-
ent custody and visitation rights, while former partners also use the act to
avoid their responsibility to provide child support.
In another case, the Court of Appeals in Houston recognized the deter-
mination of child custody by a California court.99 In that situation, a
same-sex couple had a baby through a surrogate. 1" The California court
determined the child's parentage before the baby was born."' The bio-
logically related partner was listed on the birth certificate as the father,
while the non-biological father was listed on the birth certificate as the
mother, and the surrogate and her husband had no legal right to the
93. Hobbs v. Van Stavern, 249 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no
pet.).
94. Id. at 1; see Robin Cheryl Miller, Child Custody and Visitation Rights Arising from
Same-sex Relationship, 80 A.L.R. 5th 1, § 6[c] (originally published in 2000) (explaining the
court's decision).
95. Hobbs, 249 S.W.3d at 2.
96. Id. at 1.
97. Id. at 5.
98. Id.
99. Bergick v. Wagner, 336 S.W.3d 805, 807 (Tex. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 2011, no
pet.). The parties petitioned the California court for an order decreeing that they were the
legal parents of the child and that the surrogate was not the legal mother. Id. The order
was subsequently granted. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
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child. 0 2 The couple then moved to Texas and ultimately separated. 0 3
The Court of Appeals had to determine if Texas could recognize the Cali-
fornia court's determination when the decision was rendered before the
child was born.10 4 The Court held that the Uniform Child Custody Juris-
diction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) provided that the state of Texas
must enforce the laws of another state. 05
These cases show some Texas courts' willingness to recognize rights for
same-sex parents and their children, but the legislature has yet to take a
stance that would permit the IV-D agency to serve children of same-sex
unions. By denying them this service, children are left without financial
support or access to the other parent; often the only remedy for families
in this situation is private litigation, which due to the cost, many families
might avoid. Despite the recent Texas court decisions demonstrating a
more broadened view of the modern family, other states with DOMAs
have not followed suit.
C. Missouri
In White v. White,'" a Missouri Court of Appeals held that a former
partner did not have standing to sue in order to establish a mother-child
relationship with her partner's biological child, and that she did not prove
102. Id. at 808.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 809. To make this determination, the court first interpreted the UCCJEA
"to determine if the California judgment qualifie[d] as a child custody determination." Id.
The court then decided whether "California lacked jurisdiction to enter such a judgment
before C.B.W. was born." Id.
105. Bergick v. Wagner, 336 S.W.3d 805, 816 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, no
pet.).
By statute, Texas law permits registration of a foreign custody order if the foreign
state (1) 'exercised jurisdiction under statutory provisions substantially in accordance'
with the UCCJEA or (2) the 'factual circumstances' meet the UCCJEA's jurisdic-
tional standards. TEx. FAM.CODE ANN. § 152.303(a) (Vernon 2008). Thus, if a
UCCJEA judgment is signed as to an unborn child and the circumstances are such
upon the child's birth that the court has sufficient jurisdictional ties, then recognizing
that judgment as a child custody determination for registration purposes is proper, as
the trial court found. Here, the California court entered judgment before C.B.W. was
born, but under California law, that order was stayed until his birth. Jurisdiction at-
tached upon the child's birth in California. Berwick has not argued that California
jurisdiction was not proper immediately upon C.B.W.'s birth, and no other state was
competing for jurisdiction over C.B.W. at that point. We hold, on these facts, that the
California court's judgment was a proper exercise of its jurisdiction under California
law.
Id.
106. White v. White, 293 S.W.3d 1, 1 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009).
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a claim for breach of contract for child support obligations."o In this
case, both lesbian partners had children through artificial insemination
before ending their relationship."os The former partner sued the biologi-
cal mother to establish a parent-child relationship with the child she was
not biologically related to, and to obtain child support from her former
partner for her biological child.109 The court denied all of her claims
against her former partner for child support."o The suing partner at-
tempted to argue that although there was no statute that expressly gave
her standing, she was nonetheless an "interested party""' and thus, the
court had jurisdiction." 2 The suing partner also argued that the common
law doctrine of exceptional circumstances applied." 3 The court stated
that when applying statutory analysis to the suing partner's claims, a gen-
der-neutral reading of the statute required them to "insert the word
'mother' for 'father' in all instances."114 The statute then read, "[an] ac-
tion to determine the existence of the [mother] and child relationship
with respect to a child who has no presumed [mother] .. . may be brought
by the specified individuals.""' This substitution allowed the court to
deny standing to the former partner because in this situation, the child
had a "presumed mother.""' This case illustrates the court's reluctance
to include alternative definitions into the existing exclusionary statutes.
D. New York
New York recently became one of the few states that recognizes same-
sex marriage, by enacting the Marriage Equality Act during the summer
of 2011."17 Like Texas, the New York Family Court Act contains a provi-
107. Id.
108. Id. at 6. Both partners used the same anonymous sperm donor. Id.
109. Id. The former partner based her claims on the fact that neither child had a
natural or presumed father and the idea that both women made a joint decision to con-
ceive the children. Id.
110. Id. at 7.
111. Id. at 9-10. The former partner based her claim on MoUPA § 210.848, which
provides "[A]ny interested party may bring an action to determine the existence or nonex-
istence of a mother and child relationship." Id. She claimed that she functioned as
C.E.W.'s mother since the time of birth. Id.
112. White v. White, 293 S.W.3d 1, 9-10 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009).
113. Id. at 17. The former partner argued that the MoUPA supplements common law
and allows the court to protect a child's best interest by exercising its parens patriae author-
ity. Id. at 3.
114. Id. at 9.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. See N.Y. Dom. Rit. LAw § 10(a) (Consol. 2011) (stating that "[a] marriage that
is otherwise valid shall be valid regardless of whether the parties to the marriage are of the
same or different sex.").
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sion that addresses child support.'18 It states that the tribunal of the state
should apply the substantive and procedural laws of the state.1 9 While
both Texas and New York have the same provision regarding the applica-
tion of the laws of the state, because New York no longer has a defense of
marriage act,1 20 it permits agency services to same-sex couples. 12 ' Also,
according to state law, in order for a couple to petition to establish a
support order, the responding tribunal may issue an order if the person
responding has been determined to be the parent pursuant to state law.1 2 2
The easiest way to fulfill this requirement is for the non-biological parent
adopt the child and be listed on the birth certificate. 1 23 Section 580-401
also permits an establishment order if "there is other clear and convincing
evidence that the respondent is the child's parent." 12 4 In comparing the
laws in Texas with the laws in New York, the New York laws are more
lenient in terms of establishing child support orders for children of same-
sex couples.
The issue of child support in New York has been recently addressed in
several cases. Before New York recognized same-sex marriage in 2011,
courts were beginning to recognize the responsibility that same-sex
couples have to their children. In H.M. v. E. T, the court recognized that
family courts have jurisdiction over the adjudication of a biological
mother's petition for child support.1 25 In that case, the non-biological
parent tried to avoid paying child support.12 6 The court, however, found
that the same duty to support children exists in homosexual relationships
as in heterosexual relationships. 127 In a concurring opinion, Judge Smith
argued that the decision in In re Custody of H.S.H-K permitted the es-
tablishment of a 'parent-like relationship' with proof of four elements,
though he felt that these particular elements would result in endless liti-
gation. 128 Some of the elements included: "'significant responsibility for
118. See N.Y. Dom. RiL. LAw § 580-303 (Consol. 1999) (allowing petitions to estab-
lish child support orders); N.Y. Dom. Rm-. LAw ch. 95, § 10 (a) (Consol. 2011).
119. N.Y. Dom. REL.. LAw § 580-303 (Consol. 1999).
120. N.Y. Dom. REL. LAw § 10(a) (2011).
121. See N.Y. Dom. REL. LAw § 580-401 (Consol. 1999) (allowing petitions to estab-
lish child support orders).
122. N.Y. Dom. REL. LAw § 580-401(b)(2) (Consol. 1999).
123. See N.Y. Dom. Ri!. LAw § 580-401(b)(3) (Consol. 1999) (requiring the respon-
dent to provide clear and convincing evidence).
124. N.Y. Dom. REL. LAw § 580-401(b)(3) (Consol. 1999).
125. H.M. v. E.T., 930 N.E.2d 206, 209 (N.Y. 2010).
126. Id. at 208.
127. Id. at 209.
128. Id. at 210. (Smith, J. concurring) (quoting In re Custody of H.S.H.-K. 533 N.W.2d
419, 421 (1995)).
168 [Vol. 15:139
CHILDREN WITHOUT STATE-RUN SUPPORT
the child's care, education and development' and a 'bonded, dependent
relationship with the child.' "129
While the courts in New York specifically stated that parents in same-
sex unions have the same rights to and responsibilities for their children
as their heterosexual counterparts, the legislature, while recognizing
same-sex marriage, has been unable to open the door to IV-D agencies to
assist in advocating on behalf of the children of same-sex unions because
of the federal statute that guides the IV-D agencies. 30 Even though
states have not specifically stated that IV-D agencies must serve children
from same-sex unions, the decisions from the New York court have
moved one step closer to equalizing state support.
E. California
In 2005, a California Supreme Court case made headlines when the
Court ruled that both partners in same-sex relationships had the same
legal obligation to their children."' Elisa B. v. Superior Court of El Do-
rado County involved a lesbian couple where both partners were artifi-
cially inseminated."3 2 One of the partners had twins and the other
partner had a son."33 One of the twins had a congenital heart defect,
Down syndrome, and required medical treatment.13 4 When the couple
separated, the partner who had been the main financial supporter of the
family advised her former partner that she could no longer support the
twins, leaving them without any support.13 5 The twins' mother sued her
former partner for child support.13 6 The attorney representing the oppos-
ing partner argued that the California legislature did not intend to stretch
the concept of a family unit to same-sex unions because the legislature
did not define it as such.' 37
129. Id.
130. See Office of Temporary Disability Assistance, Division of Child Support En-
forcement, Noncustodial Parent Information, (2011), http://www.childsupport.ny.gov/dese/
noncustodialparent-info.html#apply (using language only directed toward "fathers").
131. Richard Gonzales, Court: Same-Sex Couples Must Provide Child Support, NAT'L
PuB. RADIO, (Aug. 23, 2005), www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld= 4811 33 3.
132. Elisa B. v. Superior Court of El Dorado Cnty., 117 P.3d 660, 663 (Cal. 2005).
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 664.
136. Id. at 662-63.
137. Id. at 664; see also Michael J. Ritter, Perry v. Schwarzenegger: Trying Same-Sex
Marriage, 13 SC-oLAR 363, 366 n.12 (2010) (analyzing the decision of Perry v.
Schwarzenegger and describing California's controversial history with same-sex marriage).
California voters adopted the California Defense of Marriage Act, also known as Pro-
position 22, in November 2000. Proposition 22 amended the California Family Code
to require marriage be only between a man and a woman. CA.. FAM. CODF § 308.5
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The California Supreme Court did not agree with the lower court's ar-
gument; instead, it held that when a couple agrees to have children
through artificial insemination, they are legally bound to support those
children.' The Court pointed out that it had previously required a non-
biological father to provide support for children from a relationship be-
cause he held the children out to be his own.' 3 9 The statutes, at the time
of Elisa B., as applied by the California Supreme Court, provided for a
more liberal interpretation of a family unit.140 When the case was before
the Court, the state recognized domestic partnerships, and the statute
read, "[t]he rights and obligations of registered domestic partners with
respect to a child of either of them shall be the same as those of
spouses."141
(Deering 2006), invalidated by Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D.
Cal. 2010). The City of San Francisco and other parties filed actions in state court
challenging Proposition 22 as violating the equal protection rights of same-sex couples.
Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010)). Id. In May 2008,
Proposition 22 was overturned, allowing the issuance of marriage licenses to same-sex
couples until the passage of Proposition 8.
Id.
138. Elisa B., 117 P.3d at 665.
139. Id. at 664.
140. CAL.. FAM. Com- § 297.5 (2006).
141. Id.
(a) Registered domestic partners shall have the same rights, protections, and benefits,
and shall be subject to the same responsibilities, obligations, and duties under law,
whether they derive from statutes, administrative regulations, court rules, government
policies, common law, or any other provisions or sources of law, as are granted to and
imposed upon spouses. (b) Former registered domestic partners shall have the same
rights, protections, and benefits, and shall be subject to the same responsibilities, obli-
gations, and duties under law, whether they derive from statutes, administrative regu-
lations, court rules, government policies, common law, or any other provisions or
sources of law, as are granted to and imposed upon former spouses. (c) A surviving
registered domestic partner, following the death of the other partner, shall have the
same rights, protections, and benefits, and shall be subject to the same responsibilities,
obligations, and duties under law, whether they derive from statutes, administrative
regulations, court rules, government policies, common law, or any other provisions or
sources of law, as are granted to and imposed upon a widow or a widower. (d) The
rights and obligations of registered domestic partners with respect to a child of either
of them shall be the same as those of spouses. The rights and obligations of former or
surviving registered domestic partners with respect to a child of either of them shall be
the same as those of former or surviving spouses. (e) To the extent that provisions of
California law adopt, refer to, or rely upon, provisions of federal law in a way that
otherwise would cause registered domestic partners to be treated differently than
spouses, registered domestic partners shall be treated by California law as if federal
law recognized a domestic partnership in the same manner as California law. (f) Reg-
istered domestic partners shall have the same rights regarding nondiscrimination as
those provided to spouses. (g) No public agency in this state may discriminate against
any person or couple on the ground that the person is a registered domestic partner
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The Court also had to determine whether it should view the second
mother as another mother or a father.142 The definition of "mother"
states: "'[tIhe parent and child relationship may be established . . . (a)
[b]etween a child and the natural mother .. . by proof of her having given
birth to the child."'" 43 The description of "father" is broader: "'[a] man is
presumed to be the natural father of a child' . . . if he is the husband of
the child's mother, is not impotent or sterile, and was cohabitating with
her; . . . if he signs a voluntary declaration of paternity stating he is the
'biological father of the child' . . . and if '[h]e receives the child into his
home and openly holds out the child as his natural child."'
1 4 4
While the Court neglected to hold that the two women were both
mothers under the definition of "mother" in the California statute, it
found that there was "no reason why both parents of a child cannot be
women." 1 45  Interestingly, the Attorney General appeared pursuant to
Section 17406 of the California Family Code to "represent the public in-
rather than a spouse or that the couple are registered domestic partners rather than
spouses, except that nothing in this section applies to modify eligibility for long-term
care plans pursuant to Chapter 15 (commencing with Section 21660) of Part 3 of Divi-
sion 5 of Title 2 of the Government Code. (h) This act does not preclude any state or
local agency from exercising its regulatory authority to implement statutes providing
rights to, or imposing responsibilities upon, domestic partners. (i) This section does
not amend or modify any provision of the California Constitution or any provision of
any statute that was adopted by initiative. (j) Where necessary to implement the
rights of registered domestic partners under this act, gender-specific terms referring to
spouses shall be construed to include domestic partners. (k)(1) For purposes of the
statutes, administrative regulations, court rules, government policies, common law,
and any other provision or source of law governing the rights, protections, and bene-
fits, and the responsibilities, obligations, and duties of registered domestic partners in
this state, as effectuated by this section, with respect to community property, mutual
responsibility for debts to third parties, the right in particular circumstances of either
partner to seek financial support from the other following the dissolution of the part-
nership, and other rights and duties as between the partners concerning ownership of
property, any reference to the date of a marriage shall be deemed to refer to the date
of registration of a domestic partnership with the state. (2) Notwithstanding para-
graph (1), for domestic partnerships registered with the state before January 1, 2005,
an agreement between the domestic partners that the partners intend to be governed
by the requirements set forth in Sections 1600 to 1620, inclusive, and which complies
with those sections, except for the agreement's effective date, shall be enforceable as
provided by Sections 1600 to 1620, inclusive, if that agreement was fully executed and
in force as of June 30, 2005.
Id.
142. Elisa B., 117 P.3d at 664-65.
143. Id. at 664.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 666. The court explained, "our decision in Johnson does not preclude a
child from having two parents both of whom are women and that no reason appears that a
child's two parents cannot both be women." Id.
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terest in establishing, modifying, and enforcing support obligations."14 6
The struggle between the California legislature and the courts over the
issue of same-sex marriage from Proposition 22147 to Proposition 8148
might have something to do with the Court's willingness to extend the
statutes' applicability to non-traditional families involving children of
same-sex unions. 1 4 9
F. Montana
In the case of In re L.EA., the biological mother of three children tried
to prevent the Montana Supreme Court from imposing a shared parent-
ing plan because the state did not have a domestic partner statute like
California, as applied in the case of Elisa B. v. Superior Court.150 In this
case, the couple had been together for twelve years and, during the
course of their relationship, they had three children. 5 1 When the couple
ended their relationship, the children's biological mother sought to move
the children, but the other partner sought to implement a shared parent-
ing plan.15 2
The Court looked to the state statutes that involved a nonparent claim-
ing a child-parent relationship."5 The Court stated, "[t]he Montana Leg-
islature also has provided that a parent's constitutionally-protected
interest in parental control of a child shall yield to the best interest of the
child when the parent's conduct is contrary to the child-parent relation-
ship.""' The district court found that the partner who was not biologi-
cally related to the children fulfilled the statute's requirements and that
she had established a child-parent relationship with all three of the chil-
dren.15 5 There was evidence that "established [she was the] primary care-
146. Id. at 665.
147. CAL. FAM. Coca § 308.5 (Deering 2006), invalidated by Perry v. Schwarzeneg-
ger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
148. CAL. CONsT. ART. I, § 7.5 (2008) (held unconstitutional by Perry v. Brown, 671
F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012).
149. Geoffrey A. Fowler, Judges Grill Attorneys on Same-Sex Marriage Ban, WA I
ST. J., (Dec. 7, 2010), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240527487034719045760039317
92982082.html?mod=googienews-wsj.
150. In re L.F.A., 220 P.3d 391, 394 (Mont. 2009).
151. Id. at 392. Both women raised the children from the times of their births and
"were involved in every aspect of caring for the children." Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 394.
154. Id.
155. Id. "The court found '[t]here is no dispute that Filpula [non-biological parent]
was involved in every aspect of caring and providing for these children."' Id. Further-
more, the child-parent relationship
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taker of each of the three children since their births."' 56 The Court
further held that the statute did not require it to find that the biological
mother was unfit.' 57 The Court explained that the 1999 Montana Legisla-
ture "amended the law to recognize specifically a child's constitutional
rights in non-parental parenting proceedings."' Despite the fact that
the Montana State Legislature has not been supportive of same-sex mar-
riage and children from homosexual unions in the past, this ruling indi-
cates the Court's willingness to hear the cause.
In an earlier case, the Court distinguished non-biological parents seek-
ing custody as opposed to just a parental interest.'5 1 In Kulstad v.
Maniaci,16 o only one of the partners of a same-sex union adopted the
children, and the partner who did not adopt the children filed suit claim-
ing a parental interest.16 ' The children's adoptive mother claimed that
the Montana statute" "improperly fails to require a court to determine
arose as a result of a joint decision by [the non-biological parent] and [the biological
parent]. The court found Ankney [the biological parent] voluntarily permitted the
children to remain continuously in the care of Filpula [the non-biological parent] for a
significant period of time so that Filpula [the non-biological parent] stood and stands
in loco parentis to the children.
Id. at 395.
156. In re L.F.A., 220 P.3d 391, 394 (Mont. 2009).
157. Id.
158. Id. at 393.
159. See Kulstad v. Maniaci, 220 P.3d 595 (Mont. 2009) (occurring just one month
prior to In re L.F.A.). The Court explained that custody is where the parent is seeking
custodianship of the child, whereas a parental interest is where the parent is seeking other
rights to the child, such as visitation rights. Id. at 527.
160. Id. at 599. The couple's lawyer "advised them that Montana law allowed only
one of them to adopt L.M. (the child]." Id. at 597. While the couple agreed to engage in
equal parenting, they decided the child would only refer to one of them as "mom," and the
child would not have a hyphenated last name. Id.
161. Id. at 597, 599.
162. MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-228 (2009). The Code states:
(1) In cases when a nonparent seeks a parental interest in a child under 40-4-211 or
visitation with a child, the provisions of this chapter apply unless a separate action is
pending under Title 41, chapter 3. (2) A court may award a parental interest to a
person other than a natural parent when it is shown by clear and convincing evidence
that: (a) the natural parent has engaged in conduct that is contrary to the child-parent
relationship; and (b) the nonparent has established with the child a child-parent rela-
tionship, as defined in 40-4-211, and it is in the best interests of the child to continue
that relationship. (3) For the purposes of an award of visitation rights under this sec-
tion, a court may order visitation based on the best interests of the child. (4) For the
purposes of this section, voluntarily permitting a child to remain continuously in the
care of others for a significant period of time so that the others stand in loco parentis
to the child is conduct that is contrary to the parent-child relationship. (5) It is not
necessary for the court to find a natural parent unfit before awarding a parental inter-
est to a third party under this section. (6) If the parent receives military service orders
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the 'fitness' of a natural parent before awarding a nonparent a parental
interest based upon the best interests of the child." 6 3 The Court ex-
plained that it was not improper, as the non-adoptive parent had proven
that she had established a parent-child relationship with the children.16 4
This case is another example of the Court's willingness to interpret stat-
utes in favor of supporting the best interest of the child. As this case
demonstrates, once a parent-child relationship has developed, it is in the
best interest of the child to allow that relationship to continue.
G. Wisconsin
Some courts have viewed the non-biological former partner as a third
party and thus forced the former partner to meet a higher burden of
proof to establish standing.6 s The Wisconsin Supreme Court explained
that in custody disputes between natural parents and third parties, it is
necessary to prove that the natural parent is unfit to some degree.166 The
Court pointed out that the term "parent" did not include a same-sex part-
ner and held that the in loco parentis approach did not apply to custody
that involve moving a substantial distance from the parent's residence or otherwise
have a material effect on the parent's ability to parent the child for the period the
parent is called to military services, as defined in 10-1-1003, the court may grant visita-
tion rights to a family member of the parent with a close and substantial relationship
to the minor child during the parent's absence if granting visitation rights is in the best
interests of the child as determined by 40-4-212.
Id.
163. Kulstad, 220 P.3d at 603. "Maniaci [the adoptive mother] further argues that her
adopted children have no constitutionally protected rights, absent a showing of abuse, neg-
lect, or dependency." Id.
164. Id. at 609. "The court acknowledged that the adoption allowed Maniaci [the
adoptive mother] to be the exclusive legal parent. The court recognized, however, that
Maniaci's [the adoptive mother] actions from the time that the children entered the home
had been entirely inconsistent with an exclusive parent-child relationship." Id. For exam-
ple, the adoptive mother allowed the non-adoptive mother to act "in a parental role for a
length of time sufficient to establish a bonded, dependent relationship with the minor chil-
dren." Id. Furthermore, the non-adoptive mother "functioned in a parental role from the
first day that each of the minor children came to the parties through the end of the parties'
relationship." Id.
165. See In re H.S.H-K., 533 N.W.2d 419, 423 (Wis. 1995) (making the non-parent
prove that the biological parent is unfit in order to have standing in custody disputes); see
also Robin Cheryl Miller, Child Custody and Visitation Rights Arising from Same-sex Rela-
tionship, 80 A.L.R. 5th 1, § 3[b] (originally published in 2000) (explaining the court's deci-
sion in the case and how they stated that the mother was not estopped from denying her
former partner visitation).
166. In re H.S.H-K., 533 N.W.2d at 423. "The court has equated the showing required
to prove that a parent is 'unfit or unable to care for the child' with the showing required of
persons petitioning for the termination of parental rights." Id.
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actions, thereby leaving the former partner without any right to
visitation.' 6 7
The Court stated that it has the power to consider the non-biological
parent of same-sex unions as a parent-like figure. 1 8 It also explained
that it was not against public policy to enforce co-parenting agreements
between a third party and a natural parent.16 9 This Court ultimately held
that it could apply equitable powers to award visitation even though state
statutes did not expressly provide for it.170 While this holding improves
the likelihood that a non-biological parent could obtain court-ordered
visitation, the non-biological parent is still required to meet a heavy bur-
den of proof.
H. Ohio
Similarly, in Liston v. Pyles,"' an Ohio Court of Appeals held that
since the child was not a product of a state-recognized marriage, 7 2 the
167. Id. at 419.
168. Id. at 435. The petitioner must have a "parent-like relationship with the child
and that a significant triggering event justifies state intervention in the child's relationship
with a biological or adoptive parent." Id.
169. Id. at 434 (overruling contrary language in In re Z.J.H.). See In re Z.J.H., 471
N.W.202, 211 (determining that the visitation statute barred any visitation contract).
170. In re H.S.H-K., 533 N.W.2d at 437. The court determined that "[ilt is reasonable
to infer that the legislature did not intend the visitation statutes to bar the courts from
exercising their equitable power to order visitation in circumstances not included within
the statutes but in conformity with the policy directions set forth in the statutes .... " Id. at
431. By exercising its equitable powers, courts protect "parental autonomy and constitu-
tional rights by requiring that the parent-like relationship develop only with the consent
and assistance of the biological or adoptive parent. It also protects a child's best interest
by preserving the child's relationship with an adult who has been like a parent." Id. at 436.
171. See generally Liston v. Pyles, No. 97APFO1 -137, 1997 WL 467327 *3 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1997); see also Robin Cheryl Miller, Child Custody and Visitation Rights Arising from
Same-sex Relationship, 80 A.L.R. 5th 1, § 7[a] (originally published in 2000) (analyzing the
court's decision in the case and its application of the equitable doctrines).
172. Om11o CONST. ART. XV, § 11, invalidated by Phelps v. Johnson, No. DVO5 305642,
2005 WL 4651081 (Ohio Misc. 2005).
Only a union between one man and one woman may be a marriage valid in or recog-
nized by this state and its political subdivisions. This state and its political subdivisions
shall not create or recognize a legal status for relationships of unmarried individuals
that intends to approximate the design, qualities, significance or effect of marriage.
Id. Phelps v. Johnson, No. DVO5 305642, 2005 WL 4651081 (Ohio Misc. 2005).
The second sentence of Article XV, Sec. 11 of the Ohio Constitution is hereby found
to violate the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution (Equal Pro-
tections Clause)... This Court finds that the second sentence of Article XV, Sec 11 of
the Ohio Constitution is in violation of the Equal Protections Clause of the United
States Constitution because the differentiation between the protections provide mar-
ried victims of domestic violence, vis-A-vis unmarried victims, bears no rational rela-
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statute concerning shared parenting plans did not apply. As a result of
this, the court denied the former partner any right to the child including
visitation rights.' 1 3 The couple lived together for sixteen years before
they decided they wanted a child.' 7 4 Once they had the child, both part-
ners cared for the child equally for three years, after which they eventu-
ally separated.'7 5 The non-biological partner sought visitation, but was
denied by the magistrate judge."' The biological parent sought child
support from her former partner.'" On appeal, the court held that the
"appellant was not a 'parent' as defined by the Ohio Revised Code, and
she therefore had no obligation to pay child support."1' Additionally,
the court stated "an underlying proceeding such as a child support pro-
ceeding, must be properly pending in order to consider a visitation re-
quest." 79 The Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's decision due to
the Ohio statutory limitations.'
The statute described child support as being pertinent "in a divorce,
dissolution of marriage, legal separation, or child support proceeding. . ."
and allowed the court to " . . . order either or both parents to support or
help support their children."' 8 ' A legal relationship between a parent
and child means "the legal relationship that exists between a child and
the child's natural or adoptive parents and upon which those sections and
any other provision of the Ohio Revised Code confer or impose rights,
privileges, duties, and obligations."' 8 2 In applying this statute, the court
denied that the former partner had standing to bring a suit for child sup-
port because she was not the biological or the adoptive parent of the
child."' Lastly, the court overruled her appeal concerning visitation be-
cause the court applied the statute.84 that only allowed for a visitation
tionship to a legitimate state interest, and the classifications drawn in the second
sentence of Article XV, Sec. 11 are not reasonable in light of its purpose.
173. Liston, No. 97APF01-137 at *4.
174. Id. at *1.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Liston v. Pyles, No. 97APF01-137, 1997 WL 467327 *1 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997)
179. Id.
180. Id. at *3.
181. Id. at *2.
182. Id.
183. Id. at *4.
184. Omo REV. CoDE ANN. § 3109.051(B)(1) (West 2006).
In a divorce, dissolution of marriage, legal separation, annulment, or child support
proceeding that involves a child, the court may grant reasonable companionship or
visitation rights to any grandparent, any person related to the child by consanguinity
or affinity, or any other person other than a parent, if all of the following apply: (a)
The grandparent, relative, or other person files a motion with the court seeking com-
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suit in cases in which the parties were divorcing or legally separating."'
The last statute the court applied described who had standing when the
biological mother was not married.1 8 6 The statute states:
If a child is born to an unmarried woman, the parents of the woman
and any relative of the woman may file a complaint requesting the
court of common pleas of the county in which the child resides to
grant them reasonable companionship or visitation rights with the
child. If the father of the child has acknowledged the child pursuant
to Section 2105.18 of the Revised Code or has been determined in an
action, to be the father of the child, the father, the parents of the
father, and any relative of the father may file a complaint requesting
the court of common pleas of the county in which the child resides to
grant them reasonable companionship or visitation rights with re-
spect to the child.'"
This case demonstrates the state statutes' narrow scope and the result-
ing restrictive court interpretations. The outcome in Ohio is extremely
different than the outcomes in California and New York due to the
court's narrow interpretation.' 88 Interestingly, California and New York
are states that have, at times, recognized same-sex marriage, whereas
Ohio has never exhibited the same willingness to consider a modern in-
terpretation of family, which is reflected in the court's opinion.
Contrast the finding in Liston with the finding in Waszkowski, where
another Ohio Court of Appeals held that a non-biological father, who
was romantically involved with the natural mother when she gave birth to
the child, had standing to file for visitation even though he was not the
biological father."89 The outcome here is very different, yet the scenario
is virtually the same with the only difference being the sexuality of the
parents. The Waszkowski court was receptive to modern families in al-
lowing a heterosexual former partner to have access to a child he sup-
ported and loved, whereas the Liston court was not willing to allow a
panionship or visitation rights. (b) The court determines that the grandparent, rela-
tive, or other person has an interest in the welfare of the child. (c) The court
determines that the granting of the companionship or visitation rights is in the best
interest of the child.
Id.
185. Liston, No. 97APF1 -137 at *6.
186. Id. at *4.
187. Id.
188. Cf id. (holding that the state's shared parenting statute did not apply to same-sex
couples), with Elisa B. v. Superior Court of El Dorado Cnty, 117 P.3d 660 (Cal. 2005)
(holding that same-sex couples have the same rights and duties to their children).
189. Waszkowski v. Lyons, No. 2008-L-007, 2009 WL 224540, at *4 (Ohio App. 2009).
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same-sex former partner the same standing." 0 The opinions in Wisconsin
and Ohio indicate that there are still some states where the judiciary is
not receptive to the idea of considering what is in the best interest of the
child.
Inevitably, the differences between states that recognize same-sex mar-
riage and those that have defense of marriage acts negatively affect chil-
dren of and parents in same-sex unions. Therefore, state legislatures
should repeal their defense of marriage acts in order to avoid perpetua-
tion of inequality and denial of services to these families. State legisla-
tures still have a long way to go before they are fully supportive of same-
sex couples and their children. In order for IV-D agencies to provide
assistance it will likely take a federal amendment since most states inde-
pendently have been slow to repeal their defense of marriage acts.
IV. SOLUTIONS TO THE CURRENT PROBLEM
A. Short-term Solutions
In many states, some court remedies are available to former spouses
who are either trying to obtain court-ordered visitation with a child they
helped raise, or for the custodial parent trying to obtain child support
from a former partner. For instance, a former partner can use an equita-
ble doctrine in order to obtain standing to file suit."'1 An example of this
is when a former partner who is acting as the custodial parent tries to use
190. Id.
The dissent's reliance on the case of Liston v. Pyles ... does not alter the outcome. In
Liston, the court held that a claim for visitation could not be maintained when the
underlying support claim was not "proper." That case is distinguishable. Liston in-
volved a dispute between two homosexual partners. When the partners separated, the
one partner filed a complaint for support and visitation against the other, deemed the
'biological' parent. The court dismissed the underlying support complaint on the
grounds that the appellee did not have standing to initiate a compliant for support, not
being the child's adoptive or biological parent. In the present case, Mason's biological
mother initiated legal proceedings by seeking support. In contrast to Liston, the un-
derlying action the present case was properly initiated. Brian's claim for visitation
should not be dismissed simply because the underlying support action failed.
Id.
191. In re T.L., No. 953-2340, 1996 WL 393521, at *3 (MoCir. Ct. 1996). The court
notably stated that they "will not avoid its constitutional duty to the minor child by bowing
to the hypothetical effects of prejudice, i.e., to refuse children of [same-sex] parents, as a
class, the rights and protection afforded children of heterosexual parents is, in the opinion
of the Court, violative of the Equal Protection Clause." Id. at 4. See also Robin Cheryl
Miller, Child Custody and Visitation Rights Arising from Same-sex Relationship, 80 A.L.R.
5th 1, § 3[b] (originally published in 2000) (outlining the cases where courts view former
partner as a third party).
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breach of contract principals to obtain child support in cases where the
former partner did not formally adopt the child.
Some states have recognized various equitable doctrines for former
partners of the biological parents.19 2 The most successful of these doc-
trines are the de facto, psychological, or equitable parent doctrines. 93 A
California Appellate Court found that a former partner was a de facto
parent because she "along with her then 'partner,' had raised the minor
as her own child virtually from birth."' 9 4 The court went on further to
say that it did not affect her de facto standing that the former partner was
not acting in the same capacity at the time she filed suit.'9 5 The Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts also found that the former partner was a
de facto parent, which allowed the court to have equity jurisdiction to
permit visitation despite the mother's desire to prevent all visitation.' 9 6
The Supreme Court of New Jersey held in V.C. v. M.J.B., that the for-
mer partner had standing to sue, and that partner was the child's "psycho-
logical parent."' During the trial, both parties provided psychologists
who spoke to the effect of not having the former partner in the child's
life, where the former partner had acted as a "co-parent" by taking on as
much responsibility as the biological mother.'98 One psychologist stated,
"that the children would benefit from continued contact with V.C. be-
cause they had a bonded relationship with her" and if the children felt
abandoned by V.C., they might also feel unnecessary guilt and assume
that they made V.C. angry or somehow caused the parties' separa-
tion."' 99 The Court further stated that the partner in this case was either
192. In re T.L., No. 953-2340 at *5; see also Robin Cheryl Miller, Child Custody and
Visitation Rights Arising from Same-sex Relationship, 80 A.L.R. 5th 1, § 3[b] (originally
published in 2000) (explaining the court's use of the equitable parent doctrine).
193. See Robin Cheryl Miller, Child Custody and Visitation Rights Arising from Same-
sex Relationship, 80 A.L.R. 5th 1, § 2[b] (originally published in 2000) (reiterating the suc-
cess that parties have had using these doctrines).
194. In re Hirenia C., 18 Ca. App. 4th 504, 514 (1st Dist. 1993); see Robin Cheryl
Miller, Child Custody and Visitation Rights Arising from Same-sex Relationship, 80 A.L.R.
5th 1, § 7[a] (originally published in 2000) (explaining the court's application of the de
facto parent doctrine).
195. In re Hirenia C., 18 Ca. App. 4th at 514.
196. E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 711 N.E.2d 886 (Mass. 1999); see Robin Cheryl Miller, Child
Custody and Visitation Rights Arising from Same-sex Relationship, 80 A.L.R. 5th 1, § 7[a]
(originally published in 2000) (stating that the couple had a co-parenting agreement).
197. V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539, 539 (N.J. 2000); see Robin Cheryl Miller, Child
Custody and Visitation Rights Arising from Same-sex Relationship, 80 A.L.R. 5th 1, § 7[a]
(originally published in 2000) (analyzing the Court's opinion as classifying the non-biologi-
cal parent as the statutory parent).
198. V.C., 748 A.2d at 544-45.
199. Id. at 544.
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a "psychological parent" or de facto parent and that this status would
grant her standing to sue for visitation in this case.20
In an unpublished opinion from a circuit court of Missouri, the court
stated, "courts must re-examine the theory that a child may have only
biological parents and adopt a more flexible 'functional approach,' as op-
posed to the traditional, more strict 'formal approach,' for defining fam-
ily."2 01 In that opinion, the court adopted "the doctrine of 'equitable
parent,' which is analogous to the doctrine of "'equitable adoption.'"
2 2
It is important to note that the child's mother was supportive in allowing
the former partner to maintain rights to the child.20 3
In cases where a former partner is not biologically related to the child
he has with his partner, the former partner can officially adopt the child.
The adoption allows the former partner a recognizable right to the child
in a court of law.2 04 While this solution is not possible in some situations,
broad implementation of adoption by the non-biological partner would
inevitably give that parent more of a legal right to file suit to affect the
parent child relationship. Formal adoption would also allow the custodial
parent of the child to obtain financial support for the child should the
relationship end.
B. Long-term Solutions
The U.S. Supreme Court has yet to address this issue directly, despite
the fact that the issue came before the Court in Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-
Jenkins, but the Court denied certiorari."20 In the Vermont Supreme
Court case, the couple entered into a civil union in Vermont before one
partner, (who had a child through artificial insemination with the part-
ner), moved to Virginia when the couple separated. 20 The biological
mother brought suit to dissolve the civil union in Vermont seeking to
have the Court grant her custody rights in accordance with a Virginia
order under the Full Faith and the Credit Clause, but the Vermont Su-
preme Court found against the biological mother and stated that it was
not obligated to apply the Virginia order under the Full Faith and Credit
200. Id. at 539.
201. Id. at 544.
202. In re T.L., 1996 WL 393521, No. 953-2340.2, at *2 (Mo. Cir. Ct. 1996).
203. V.C., 748 A.2d at 544.
204. TEjx. FAM. CODE § 151.001 (2006).
205. Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, 912 A.2d 951 (Vt. 2006), cert. denied, 550 U.S.
918 (2007); see also Robin Cheryl Miller, Child Custody and Visitation Rights Arising from
Same-sex Relationship, 80 A.L.R. 5th 1, § 15 (originally published in 2000) (explaining the
facts of the case).
206. Miller-Jenkins, 912 A.2d at 956.
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Clause.20 7 This case represents a problem that many same-sex couples
face where they were married in one state and moved to another state
before having children.
Due to the growing number of states that recognize same-sex marriage,
it is only a matter of time before the Supreme Court addresses the issue
of the Full Faith and Credit Clause in same-sex marriages. If the Su-
preme Court rules that DOMA violates the Full Faith and Credit Clause,
and holds that the DOMA is unconstitutional, it would create a great
opportunity for Congress to address the inadequacies of the IV-D agency
structure.
Since courts look to legislative intent when interpreting laws, recogniz-
ing the importance of carving out legislation for this area of law is critical
for legislatures in every state.2 0 8 Many states do not have clear statutes
explaining the rights of former partners to the children they had a part in
rearing, so the legislature in every state should respond accordingly. The
modern family is no longer comprised of a traditional biological mother
and father, and as more states recognize gay marriage, more same-sex
couples will start having children of their own.
While adoption certainly gives more rights to the parent, it should not
be the only legally recognized option for same sex couples. Modern ad-
vances in science have created an opportunity for same-sex couples to
experience having a child of their own through surrogacy and artificial
insemination.2 0 9 As stated above, the federal government must also
amend its current interpretation of who should benefit from the IV-D
agency services because states are required to implement the federal
policies.
207. Id. at 951-52. The Court held:
(1) [Flamily court was not required under the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act
(PKPA) to give full faith and credit to order of Virginia court finding mother to be the
"sole biological and natural parent" of child and denying partner visitation rights; (2)
federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) did not require family court to give full
faith and credit to order issued by Virginia court; (3) civil union entered into by parties
was not rendered void due to fact that it was entered into when partners were re-
sidents of Virginia; (4) partner was a "parent" within meaning of Parentage Proceed-
ings Act; and (5) evidence supported conclusion that mother violated temporary
visitation order.
Id.
208. See Jason N.W. Plowman, When Second-Parent Adoption is the Second Best Op-
tion: The Case for Legislative Return as the Next Best Option for Same-Sex Couples in the
Face of Continued Marriage Inequality, 11 ScHOLAR 57, 74 (2008) ("Adoption is a creature
of statue, making legislatrue a natural for adoption reform.").
209. Donor Insemination: The Basics, supra note 15; Overview of the Surrogacy Pro-
cess, Hum. RTS. CAMPAIGN, http://www.hrc.org/resources/entryfoverview-of-the-surrogacy-
process (last visited July 8, 2012).
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V. CONCLUSION
As the H.M. case illustrates, more courts are forced to decide to what
rights same-sex couples are entitled, which has led to a variety of stan-
dards. 210 The problem with multiple standards is that there is inconsis-
tency in the laws, leaving some individuals at a severe disadvantage
depending on where they live. 2 1 ' Luckily, in the case of H.M., which took
place in New York, the court was willing to consider a non-traditional
family as equally deserving of the rights and protections that heterosexual
couples receive, but that is not always the case.2 12 The Supreme Court of
California has also been more receptive to non-traditional families and
since they recognize domestic partnerships, the statutes have made it eas-
ier to provide same-sex couples with conservatorship and child support
enforcement. 213 More conservative states tend to adhere strictly to the
state statutes, which not only contain limited definitions for mother and
father, but also define marriage as between a man and a woman.2 14
Another issue that has begun to play out is that legislatures have re-
sponded to courts' broad application of the statutes, by making the stat-
utes even more restrictive.21 5 California is a good example where the
courts have tended to provide same-sex with more rights by holding that
statutorily defining marriage as between a man and a woman only was
contrary to the state constitution.2 16 The California state legislature re-
sponded to the court action by passing Proposition 8, which amended the
state constitution to exclude same-sex couples.21 7
While many people suffer as a result of the inconsistent laws regarding
children from same-sex unions, the children are the ones who suffer the
most. In some cases, they are denied access to a person, who by all ac-
counts, has served as a parent in their life. As with any separation, a child
who is suddenly forced to deal with a parent leaving their home often-
times feels as if he is the reason for the separation. The feelings of guilt
and inferiority are even more prevalent in the case of same-sex parents
when the parent is denied any access to the child.
210. H.M. v. E.T., 930 N.E.2d 206, 206 (N.Y. 2010).
211. See Liston v. Pyles, No. 97APF01-137, 1997 WL 467327 (Ohio App. 1997) (dem-
onstrating the court's unwillingness to extend standing to unrelated homosexual partners).
212. H.M., 930 N.E.2d.
213. CAL. FAM. CODE § 297.5 (West 2006).
214. Ohio Const. art. XV, § 11.
215. Michael J. Ritter, Perry v. Schwarzenegger Trying Same-Sex Marriage, 13
SCHOLAR 363, 366 (2010).
216. TEX. FAM. § 297.5.
217. CAL. CONST. ART. I, § 7.5 (2008) (held unconstitutional by Perry v. Brown, 671
F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012).
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A different problem exists for the custodial parent, who is charged with
raising the child on his or her own without any support from the other
parent. Same-sex couples contemplate having children as much as, or
more so than, heterosexual couples because of the intense scrutiny they
know they will likely receive from the community. Both scenarios re-
quire both partners to commit to having a child, which includes the prom-
ise to support the child whether the relationship continues or not. It is
imperative for the states with DOMAs to recognize that same-sex part-
nerships are just as legitimate as their opposite-sex counterpart by offi-
cially acknowledging them as such. One reason this is so imperative is
because the children of these partnerships are suffering from the delegi-
timization of their parents' relationship, and the states' refusal to inter-
vene on their behalf. Once any child is brought into the world, it is not
only up to both parents to provide for the child, but it is also the duty of
the IV-D state agency that is charged by the United States Code to pro-
vide services to ensure that the child's best interests are adequately met.
As the issue of same-sex marriage continues to be a topic of debate,
with more states becoming receptive to same-sex marriage, it is important
for those states to legislate accordingly so that the same state services will
be available to same-sex couples and their children. The states that are
the most receptive to same-sex marriage have been the most willing to
consider the idea of a non-traditional family and find ways to apply the
existing state statutes to homosexual couples as well. While most states
have some sort of definition for "mother" and "father," it is currently up
to the courts to decide how same-sex partners fit into that scheme. It is
also important for states to recognize the decision in Troxel when drafting
legislation, so that it is not so broad that it would be held unconstitutional
on substantive due process grounds.2 18 Nonetheless, it is critical for
courts to continue to analyze the statutes more broadly until state legisla-
tures take notice and realize the need for clear laws that protect homo-
sexuals as well.
The most beneficial thing that can happen for children of same-sex un-
ions is for the state legislatures to enact laws that include same-sex fami-
lies in their respective family codes. There must be an expansion of the
definition of "mother" and "father" as it is currently defined in the state
family codes to provide the necessary support for all children. Unfortu-
nately, it does not appear that state legislatures will independently move
toward this notion. Therefore, it is imperative for Congress to enact leg-
islation that specifically addresses this issue, so that all courts will consist-
ently apply the same standard, and all children will have adequate
interaction with and support from both of their parents.
218. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
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